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PARADIGMS LOST: THE SECOND CIRCUIT FACES
THE NEW ERA OF RELIGION CLAUSE
JURISPRUDENCE
Donald L. Beschle*
INTRODUCTION
During the 1989-90 term, the Second Circuit decided several
cases presenting issues under the religion clauses of the First
Amendment." While the facts of the cases are interesting, the
issues presented were not unique or particularly novel; the deci-
sions might not seem noteworthy under normal circumstances.
But these are not normal times for the religion clauses. Both the
Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause have been
the subject of renewed interest by the Supreme Court. Wide-
spread dissatisfaction with the tests developed a generation ago
to assess claims under these provisions has led to serious recon-
sideration of both standards. With regard to the Establishment
Clause, the three-part test enunciated in Lemon v. Kurtzman2
survives, at least in theory, but two alternative ways of ap-
proaching Establishment Clause claims, one developed by Jus-
tice O'Connor, the other by Justice Kennedy, now contend for
acceptance. In short, the future direction of Establishment
Clause jurisprudence is unclear, but change is in the air.
In Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources of Oregon
v. Smith3 the Supreme Court charted a course for the future of
the Free Exercise Clause that seems anything but unclear. But
the new standard diverges so sharply from the law of the last
two decades, and seems to diminish so seriously the force of the
constitutional guarantee, that one is reluctant to conclude that
the debate over the scope of the clause is over. The inadequacies
of the Smith test may require its refinement or reconsideration,
* Associate Professor of Law, The John Marshall Law School. J.D., New York Uni-
versity; BA ., Fordlam University.
I "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof ... ." U.S. CoNsr. amend. L
2 403 U.S. 602 (1971). See notes 78-85 and accompanying text infra.
110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990). See notes 121-31 and accompanying text infra.
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and that will require the existence of doctrinal alternatives
which seem both theoretically and practically attractive.
When we examine this past term's Second Circuit religion
clause cases against the background of recent efforts by the Su-
preme Court to improve the standards that control in such
cases, the juxtaposition provides a number of insights. First, the
cases illustrate quite well why many feel frustrated by the reli-
gion clause doctrine of recent decades. If applied literally and
stringently, old rules produce results that seem not only wrong
but, in the case of the Free Exercise Clause, almost anarchic. In
order to avoid such results the tests must be applied in a way
that makes them seem too imprecise to be useful. Debate over
the religion clauses may be subsumed in a larger debate over the
relative value of clarity and flexibility in law.4
In addition to helping explain the past and present, the
cases may also provide some suggestions for the future. At least
one of last term's cases, apparently applying pre-Smith free ex-
ercise law, may illustrate an alternative to Smith that avoids at
least some of the problems which led to Smith and Smith's re-
jection of earlier standards. On the other hand, another case, in
which Justice O'Connor's test is purportedly applied, with re-
sults that seem at best questionable, may suggest future devel-
opments in Establishment Clause jurisprudence that are by no
means encouraging.
This Article will begin by describing last term's Second Cir-
cuit religion clause decisions: Kaplan v. City of Burlington,"
Theriault v. A Religious Office,6 Benjamin v. Coughtin,7 and
New York State National Organization for Women (NOW) v.
Terry.8 Part II will describe the changes and tensions that have
' The most recent renewal of this perennial debate was largely sparked by an article
by Justice Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Cui. L. REv. 1175 (1989), and
comments on Justice Scalia's thoughts as they appear there and elsewhere. Perhaps the
most interesting of these analyses is Kannar, The Constitutional Catechism of Antonin
Scalia, 99 YALE L.J. 1297 (1990).
A 891 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1989) (before Feinberg, Meskill and Lumbard, JJ.; opinion
per Feinberg, J., dissent per Meskill, J.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2619 (1990).
6 895 F.2d 104 (2d Cir. 1990) (before Oakes, CJ., Pratt and Sand, JJ.; opinion per
Oakes, C.J.).
1 905 F.2d 571 (2d Cir. 1990) (before Miner, Van Graafeiland and Pierce, J.J.; opin-
ion per Miner, J.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 372 (1990).
0 886 F.2d 1339 (2d Cir. 1989) (before Cardamone, Pratt and Lasker, J.J.; opinion
per Cardamone, J.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2206 (1990).
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emerged recently in religion clause jurisprudence, and that pro-
vide the background for understanding the significance of the
cases sketched in Part I. Part HI will analyze the cases and at-
tempt to assess their possible relevance to the future of the reli-
gion clauses.
I. THE CASES
A. Kaplan v. City of Burlington
The city of Burlington, Vermont, has nineteen parks, per-
haps the most prominent of which is City Hall Park. City Hall
Park is a two and one-half acre downtown plot of land, bordered
on three sides by streets lined with commercial buildings, and on
the fourth side by City Hall, the Old Fire Station and a bank.10
The park is typical of New England town squares, with trees,
benches, a circular fountain, two monuments to those killed in
different wars and various other functional fixtures."
City Hall Park is a public forum, but certain uses involving
large groups, exclusive use or reservation of particular times and
spaces require a special permit from the city. 2 In the five years
preceding this lawsuit, about three hundred permits had been
issued "for commercial, religious . . . political or quasi-political
activities," as well as for more innocuous uses such as picnics
and softball games. No permit request was denied during this
time period.1 3 Until 1986 the religious uses allowed by permit
included one-day gatherings of believers for activities such as
gospel music concerts, a "Jesus rally," and distribution of food
and clothing to the poor. 4 In December 1986 the Vermont Or-
ganization for Jewish Education-Lubavitch-was granted a
permit to erect a wrought iron menorah,15 approximately twelve
9 Kaplan v. City of Burlington, 891 F.2d 1024, 1025 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110
S. Ct. 2619 (1990).
20 Kaplan v. City of Burlington, 700 F. Supp. 1315, 1317 (D. Vt. 1988).
11 Id.
12 Id. (citing BURLINGTON, VT. Crr CODE, ch. 22, app. D).
13 Id. at 1317-18.
14 891 F.2d at 1026. Until 1986 no permit was sought for the display "of an unat-
tended, solitary religious symbol," nor for the use of the park for a time period as long as
eight days. Id. See also note 48 infra.
15 A menorah is a religious symbol of the Jewish faith, and is recognized as
such by the general public. The menorah is associated with Chanukalh, a reli-
gious holiday observed by Jews during an eight-day period which ordinarily
1991]
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feet wide and sixteen feet high, in the park and to leave it stand-
ing there during the eight days of Chanukah. The menorah was
accompanied by a sign, "visible to some distance in a westerly
direction," stating "'Happy Chanukah' 'Sponsored by:
Lubavitch of Vermont.'"16 The same display was erected, also
pursuant to a permit, in December 1987, and again stood for the
eight days of Chanukah. 17 The display created some controversy:
the city received a number of phone calls supporting and oppos-
ing the presence of the menorah.18 Some of the opposition was
"blatantly anti-semitic;"'19 other opponents objected to any reli-
gious symbols in a public park. In December 1987 the city felt
the need to convene a press conference to explain that the me-
norah was not sponsored by the government.21 Plaintiffs, includ-
ing a Unitarian minister and the rabbi of a Reform Jewish con-
gregation, sued to enjoin the menorah display from being
permitted in City Hall Park in December 1989.22
falls between the latter part of November and the first part of January of each
year. A menorah is a nine pronged candelabra representing the eight days of
Chanukah, with one space for a candle used to light the other eight .... Each
Chanukah the menorah is lit to celebrate the miracle of a continuously burning
light . . . "[wjhen the Maccabees rededicated the Temple, they had only
enough oil to last for one day. But . . .the oil miraculously lasted for eight
days (the length of time it took to obtain additional oil)."
891 F.2d at 1026 (quoting County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989)).
16 700 F. Supp. at 1318. "The Lubavitch movement is a Hasidic sect that seeks to
reawaken interest among Jews in traditional Judaism." 891 F.2d at 1026. The Vermont
group is associated with Chabad Lubavitch, a larger group that advocates the display of
menorahs all over the country. Id.
17 891 F.2d at 1026.
18 700 F. Supp. at 1320. The menorah received "widespread press attention" in
1987; apparently it had not gotten such attention in 1986, nor in the two prior years,
when the menorah was displayed for only one day. 891 F.2d at 1027. Some, including the
Burlington City Attorney, believed that the menorah became controversial in 1987 be-
cause only a week before Burlington issued the permit, the nearby town of Hyde Park,
Vermont, settled a lawsuit by agreeing to remove a cross from the top of a Christmas
tree located on the front lawn of the Hyde Park courthouse. Id. It is reasonable to be-
lieve, then, that despite the fact that the decisions regarding the cross and the menorah
were made by different government units, at least some of the hostility to the menorah
was actually displaced resentment over the removal of the cross in Hyde Park, that is,
anger that the menorah seemed entitled to greater protection than the cross.
11 700 F. Supp. at 1321 n.7.
20 Two of the plaintiffs offered private property to Vermont Lubavitch as an alter-
native site for the menorah. 891 F.2d at 1027.
:1 700 F. Supp. at 1320.
2 Id. at 1321 n.8. The fact that the named plaintiffs were "literate and educated"
led the district court to characterize their complaint as essentially "that other individu-
[Vol. 57: 547
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The district court dismissed the suit, holding that the three-
part Lemon test 23 was not violated by the display. The city's
purpose in granting the permit, the court held, was the secular
goal of permitting equal access to a traditional public forum.2
There was no significant entanglement of government and reli-
gion in the application process.2 5 Finally, the district court held
that the display did not have the primary effect of advancing
religion. Focusing on the question of whether an act of govern-
ment "conveys the appearance of government endorsement," 26
the court found that given the presence of the sign with the me-
norah, and given the status of City Hall Park as a traditional
public forum, any perception of government endorsement would
be not only erroneous, but also unreasonable. Thus, the city "did
not objectively convey a message of endorsement of religion"
and did not violate the "effect" inquiry of the Lemon test.27
On appeal, a divided panel of the Second Circuit reversed. 8
Judges Feinberg and Lumbard held that the menorah was im-
permissible in light of the recent Supreme Court decision in
County of Allegheny v. ACLU.29 In Allegheny a divided Court
held that a similar menorah, displayed next to a Christmas tree,
was a permissible display in front of a government office build-
ing, but that a privately maintained creche, standing alone, was
not permissible in the lobby of a courthouse.30 Four justices
would have permitted both displays, three would not have per-
als - not them - might get the wrong impression [that Burlington was endorsing religion
rather than merely allowing speech in a public forum]." Id.
'3 See notes 78-85 and accompanying text infra.
11 700 F. Supp. at 1319 (citing the obligations of a government entity to permit ac-
cess to a public forum set out in Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S.
37 (1983)).
25 Id. at 1319-20.
28 Id. at 1320.
27 Id. at 1322 n.9. While the court found that even an erroneous perception of gov-
ernment endorsement could be sufficient to lead to an Establishment Clause violation, it
insisted that such a perception be "objectively reasonable," and not limited to those who,
for reasons such as age or illiteracy, might not be able to understand the sign or the press
conference explaining the absence of city endorsement, or the general policy of free ac-
cess to the park for First Amendment activity. Id. at 1321-22.
Kaplan v. City of Burlington, 891 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1989).
" 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
30 Id. at 598-602 (invalidating the creche) and at 613-21 (permitting the menorah).
Both displays were located in Pittsburgh. The courthouse lobby was found not to be a
public forum, id. at 600 n.50; whether the area in front of the office building qualified as
a public forum was not discussed.
1991]
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mitted either display. Justices O'Connor and Blackmun cast the
deciding votes, and held that the creche, but not the menorah,
improperly conveyed a message of government endorsement of
religion.3 1
The Kaplan majority took Allegheny, along with the earlier
case of Lynch v. Donnely,32 to establish a rule invalidating "un-
attended, solitary religious symbols on public property" and per-
mitting them only when accompanied by secular symbols of
comparable nature.3 In dissent, Judge Meskill stressed that to
bar religious symbols in this case was "a content-based restric-
tion on religious expression in a public forum" and that, under
cases such as Widmar v. Vincent, 4 it is such an exclusion rather
than the issuance of the permit that deserves strict scrutiny.
Considering that City Hall Park is a traditional public forum,
that the display is present only during Chanukah, and that there
was a prominent sign attesting to the private ownership of the
menorah, no reasonable observer could take the display to be an
official endorsement of religion. Rather, the menorah could be
seen only as endorsement of the principle of equal access to
traditional First Amendment forums.3 5
B. Theriault v. A Religious Office in the Structure of the
Government Requiring a Religious Test as a Qualification
Shiloh Harry Theriault, also known as Harry W. Theriault,
Dr. Harry Theriault and the Bishop of Tellus, has spent most of
the last two decades in several different federal prisons. He has
spent a significant amount of his confinement as a party to law-
31 Justice Kennedy concurred, with Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and
Scalia, in advocating permission of both displays, id. at 655-79 (Kennedy, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part); Justice Brennan wrote on behalf of himself, Justice Mar.
shall and Justice Stevens for the position that both were invalid, id. at 637-46 (Brennan,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
32 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (rejecting the contention that the Establishment Clause was
violated by the display of a creche as part of a larger publicly financed holiday display in
a prominent, but private, park in Pawtucket, Rhode Island).
33 891 F.2d 1030. The court repeated the phrase "unattended, solitary" religious
symbol a number of times; once a third adjective, "semi-permanent," was added.
454 U.S. 263 (1981). In Widmar the Court held that a state university's practice
of excluding student groups from forums open to most such groups on the basis of the
religious nature of the excluded groups' purpose and message violated the free exercise
rights of the religious student groups.
88 891 F.2d at 1031-34 (Meskill, J., dissenting).
(Vol. 57:547
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suits in federal court, "either as a plaintiff complaining of prison
conditions or as a defendant being prosecuted for unruly prison
conduct.""8 While imprisoned in Atlanta in 1970, Theriault ob-
tained a mail-order Doctor of Divinity Certificate and founded
the Church of the New Song, made up entirely of inmates. At
first, Theriault considered his "Eclatarian" faith to be a "game"
but later "began to take his own religious claims seriously" to
the point where at least some prison officials believed his activi-
ties to be "truly religious in nature. '37
In 1970 Theriault brought suit against officials of the Bu-
reau of Prisons seeking, under the Free Exercise Clause, the
right to conduct religious services at the prison. In addition, the
suit sought, under the Establishment Clause, a ruling that the
activities of the Bureau's chaplain were unconstitutional. 38 Al-
though the district court dismissed the contention that the hir-
ing of chaplains was a violation of the Establishment Clause, it
did enjoin the chaplains' practice of reporting on prisoners' par-
ticipation in religious activities to caseworkers who would use
these reports, among others, to prepare the inmate profiles
presented to the Board of Parole.39 The court reasoned that by
making religious activity a positive factor in parole determina-
tions, the Bureau "may compel some to participate in religious
" Church of New Song v. Establishment of Religion, 620 F.2d 648, 654 n.5 (7th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 929 (1981). The footnote sets out the citations for all of
Theriault's cases up to 1980, and takes up about three-quarters of a page of small print.
37 Theriault v. Carlson, 339 F. Supp. 375, 377-78 (N.D. Ga. 1972), vacated and re-
manded, 495 F.2d 390 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 498 F.2d 1402, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1003
(1974). Theriault's claim to religious authority certainly sounded like either "a game" or
an attempt to take biblical literalism to a new plane. Serving time for robbery, Theriault
pointed to Revelation 3:3, "If you will not awake, I will come like a thief, and you will
not know at what hour I will come upon you," and claimed to be the thief referred to in
the text. 339 F. Supp. at 377 n.1.
Id. at 377-78.
39 Id. at 380-82.
There can be no doubt that an inmate whose file contains a positive religious
report stands a better chance of being released on parole than an inmate with a
neutral or negative religious report. Indeed, it is likely that the inmates' very
knowledge of the existence of these religious reports may compel some to par-
ticipate in religious activities. The Government, by allowing these religious re-
ports to be submitted, is in effect promoting religion among inmates and indi-
rectly punishing the atheist, agnostic or [member of Therault'a church] who
declines to participate in these religious programs.
Id. at 382. The Fifth Circuit, in vacating and remanding this decision, did not address
the Establishment Clause issue, but rather focused on the religious sincerity of Ther-
iault's free exercise claims. 495 F.2d at 393-95.
1991]
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activity" in violation of the neutrality called for by the Estab-
lishment Clause.40
The district court also responded favorably to Theriault's
free exercise claim, holding that prison officials could not pro-
hibit religious services simply because they were proposed by an
unusual denomination, even one with "fanatical or preposter-
ous" beliefs, unless a clear threat to prison discipline or some
other compelling interest could be demonstrated. 41 Theriault
later filed an action alleging a failure by prison officials to com-
ply with that portion of the court's ruling, and also filed an inde-
pendent action asserting a free exercise claim against prison offi-
cials at the federal penitdntiary at La Tuna, Texas, where he
had been transferred. After these cases had been consolidated,
Theriault's claims were dismissed by the District Court for the
Western District of Texas.42
The court based its holding on a finding that Theriault's
Church of the New Song did not qualify as a religion, but was
instead a "masquerade" to obtain protection for a "philosophy,
the sole purpose of which is to cause or encourage disruption of
established prison discipline for the sake of disruption. 43 The
religious services were no more than "gripe sessions" and "were
totally lacking in anything approaching religious content."44
Closely related to the question of whether Theriault's church
was a genuine religion was the court's inquiry into the sincerity
of Theriault's professed beliefs. The court found Theriault's pro-
fession that he is the second Messiah to be "insincere." 4 6
Theriault appealed from this decision, but the Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit dismissed the pro se appeal, with
40 339 F. Supp. at 382.
41 Id. at 382-83. It was on this point that the appellate court found that the district
court had been remiss. Theriault had not been required to substantiate sufficiently his
sincerity and the religious nature of his organization. 495 F.2d at 393-95.
41 Theriault v. Silber, 453 F. Supp. 254 (W.D. Tex. 1978). In an opinion that almost
reeks of impatience, not only at Theriault, but also at the appellate court for allowing
the litigation to continue, Judge Wood focused on Theriault's claim to head a bona fide
religion.
43 Id. at 260.
4 Id. at 260 ("Petitioner and his cohorts have formed an organization whose pur-
pose is to improve the position of member prison inmates vis.&-vis prison administra-
tions. . . . [T]he unmistakeable stench of the skunk is found eminating from that which
petitioner has declared a rose.").
45 Id. at 261. The court compared Theriault's views to "the megalomania of Adolf
Hitler . . . or Charles Manson . . . ." Id.
[Vol. 57: 547
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prejudice, after two notices of appeal were filed containing "vile
and insulting references to the trial court." 6 And so, when Ther-
iault, now having been transferred to the federal penitentiary in
Marion, Illinois, instituted another suit seeking free exercise
protection for his church, the district court and court of appeals
dismissed the claim on res judicata grounds, citing Theriault's
Texas suit.47 Interestingly enough, in a suit brought by prisoners
of the Iowa State Penitentiary seeking free exercise protection
for the Church of the New Song, the District Court for the
Southern District of Iowa held that the Iowa branch of the
church did qualify as a religion, and that there was insufficient
evidence to conclude that its members were insincere. 8
The district court in Iowa held that it was not bound by the
judgment of the district court in Texas; the facts in the cases
involving Theriault himself "were simply not the facts in this
case." 49 At least with respect to the Iowa State Penitentiary con-
gregation, the court found that the church had sufficient resem-
blance to recognized religions, it "afford[ed] its members a sense
of self-worth and inspire[d] a sense of community,"8 0 discour-
aged violence and hate and did not on its face urge conduct in-
compatible with prison life. Thus, the members of the church
were guaranteed free exercise rights in prison, subject to "neu-
tral reasonable regulation" which would be permissible in the
case of any religious practice by inmates.41 Ironically enough,
due largely to procedural rules of res judicata and collateral es-
toppel, the Church of the New Song was held entitled to free
exercise protection only where the congregation seeking such
protection was not headed by the founder of the church.
"' Theriault v. Silber, 574 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1978). Theriault was given ten days to
file proper notice, but his second notice of appeal was also found to be abusive, and this
time the appeal was dismissed with prejudice. Theriault v. Silber, 579 F.2d 302 (5th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 917 (1979).
"' Church of New Song v. Establishment of Religion, 620 F.2d 648 (7th Cir. 1980).
4' Loney v. Scurr, 474 F. Supp. 1186 (S.D. Iowa 1979); Remmers v. Brewer, 361 F.
Supp. 537 (S.D. Iowa 1973), aff'd per curiam, 494 F.2d 1277 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1012 (1974).
4 474 F. Supp. at 1190.
Id. at 1193.
51 Id. at 1197. The Iowa court criticized other courts' treatment of the Church of the
New Song for "muddl[ing] the distinct question of whether the Church is a religion with
the question of what limitations may permissibly be placed on the congregation exercise
of the Church of the New Song in a prison environment." Id. at 1195.
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Nevertheless, Theriault, now incarcerated at the federal fa-
cility in Otisville, New York, was back in federal court in 1984,
with a case remarkably similar to his 1970 lawsuit. Theriault
now claimed to head the Holy Mizanic faith and claimed that
Otisville prison officials were denying the members of that reli-
gion free exercise protection.52 In addition, Theriault again chal-
lenged the activity of state-employed chaplains on Establish-
ment Clause grounds. He alleged that chaplains participate in
nonreligious activity, such as discipline of prisoners, and that
this was evident from the Inmate Handbook which provided
that in addition to caring for inmates' spiritual needs, the chap-
lains "will also assist in the correctional process to the fullest
extent possible. ' 5 3
Nearly five years after the filing of Theriault's suit, the dis-
trict court granted judgment on the pleadings to defendants.
But a unanimous panel of the Second Circuit reversed and re-
manded the case for further proceedings. With respect to Ther-
iault's claim concerning the activity of authorized chaplains, the
court found that Theriault was not merely challenging the power
of the prison system to hire chaplains, but rather was challeng-
ing the scope of those chaplains' duties. The court stated that
"prison chaplains' exercise of substantial government authority
may constitute excessive religious entanglement in the affairs of
the state, even if the employment of prison chaplains does
not. '54 On remand, the district court was directed to examine
"the scope of the authority exercised by prison chaplains" to de-
termine whether the Establishment Clause or Religious Test
Clause was violated.55 With respect to Theriault's free exercise
claims, the district court was directed to conduct an inquiry into
whether the Holy Mizanic faith is a religion, or merely a
renamed version of the Church of the New Song, and if the new
faith is a religion, whether the rights of its adherents were being
5, Theriault v. A Religious Office, 895 F.2d 104, 105-06 (2d Cir. 1990), rev'g 709 F.
Supp. 115 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
88 Id. at 106.
Id. at 107. The court cited Theriault v. Carlson, 339 F. Supp. 375 (N.D. Ga. 1972),
and distinguished prior cases sustaining the government's power to hire and pay chap.
lains as being limited to approving employment of such chaplains to meet the religious
needs of prisoners or military personnel. See Katcoff v. Marsh, 755 F.2d 233 (2d Cir,
1985).
15 895 F.2d at 107. U.S. CONST. art.VI provides in part: "no religious Test shall ever
be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States."
[Vol. 57:5647
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abridged. 6
C. Benjamin v. Coughlin
This case also concerned free exercise claims by inmates,
but the circumstances are much less complex. Rastafarian in-
mates in New York State Department of Correctional Services
institutions brought suit against prison authorities claiming the
right to hold regular religious services, the right to "a vegetarian
diet with foodstuffs that their faith permits them to eat," 7 ex-
emption from the general requirement that inmates have their
hair cut before being photographed upon arrival at the institu-
tion, and the right to wear "loose fitting knit headgear known as
'crowns'.""8 The district court, accepting the religious nature of
both the Rastafarian movement and the inmates' specific
claims, 59 enjoined enforcement of the haircut regulation against
plaintiffs, but rejected the other claims.6 0
A unanimous panel of the Second Circuit affirmed. Drawing
specifically on cases involving prison rules,61 the court found
that the standard to be applied to a free exercise claim in such
an environment is whether the regulation in question is "reason-
ably related to legitimate penological interests" in light of the
impact that an exemption would have on the penal system, the
presence or absence of alternative means by which the prisoners
might exercise their rights, and the existence or absence of
"ready alternatives... which accommodate the right and satisfy
zaId.
'I Benjamin v. Cougblin, 905 F.2d 571, 580 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 372
(1990). The inmates did not seek, either as part of their diet or part of their religious
services, the right to smoke marijuana. Id. at 573 n.2. Outside the context of prisons,
Rastafarians have argued for religious exemption from drug laws for their practice of
smoking marijuana during religious ceremonies. See Note, Soul Rebels: The Rastafari-
ans and the Free Exercise Clause, 72 GEo. L.J. 1605, 1620.23 (1984).
5 905 F.2d at 573. "A fundamental tenet of the religion is that a Rastafarian's hair
is not to be combed or cut, resulting in rope-like strands known as 'dreadlocks."' Id.
' Benjamin v. Coughlin, 708 F. Supp. 570, 571 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). Prison authorities
did not challenge the religious nature of the claim. New York state courts have affirmed
the contention that Rastafarianism is a religion for First Amendment purposes. See
Overton v. Coughlin, 133 A.D.2d 744, 520 N.Y.S.2d 32 (2d Dep't 1987). For a concise
description of Rastafarianism and the question of whether it is a religion, see Note,
supra note 57, at 1605-14.
1o 708 F. Supp. at 577.
61 905 F.2d. at 574 (citing O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987); Turner
v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974)).
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the government interest." 2 These same factors would be applied
to plaintiffs' equal protection claim, that is, that especially with
respect to the prohibition of headgear, their religious claims
were treated differently from analogous claims by prisoners of
other faiths.6 3
Although the court accepted the need for prison authorities
to obtain photographs accurately depicting inmates "for pur-
poses of identification in the event of escape," the court found
that the alternative of photographing inmates with their hair
tied back in "pony tails" would satisfy the state's interest. 4 The
prison permitted any inmate to regrow his hair, and reserved the
right to photograph any inmate whose appearance changed dras-
tically, demonstrating its own understanding of the fact that
how the inmate looked upon entry is less important than how he
looks upon escape. A Rastafarian prisoner would surely regrow
his hair as soon as possible after his initial haircut. Thus, the
district court was upheld in its holding that refusal to accommo-
date Rastafarian prisoners with respect to the haircut regulation
failed the balancing test required by the Free Exercise Clause.
On the other hand, the court upheld the denial of the Ras-
tafarians' right to congregate for prayer. Prison regulations re-
quired that religious services may take place only if the prison
religious group has a "free-world sponsor," that is, an individual
or group outside the prison who regularly visits and communi-
cates with the prisoners group. The purposes of outside sponsor-
ship are "to ensure that the meeting is convened for religious
purposes" and not for illegitimate reasons, and "to minimize
conflicts among inmates as to the nature and content of the ser-
vice. '" Although Rastafarians have no traditional clergy, an
"Elder," one educated in the religion, could serve the same pur-
pose in satisfying the regulation. The fact that no Elder had
come forward was described as simply not the fault of prison
62 Id. As the court noted, this was described in Turner, 482 U.S. at 81, as "a lesser
standard" than that used outside the prison environment.
63 Id. at 575. Other religious headgear, specifically the Jewish yarmulke and the
Muslim Kufi, were permitted. Id. at 579. Jewish and Muslim prisoners were also ac-
corded some "special dietary accommodation." Id.
" Id. at 576-77. Such accommodations would have only "a de minimis effect on
valid penological interests." Id. at 577. Plaintiffs did not challenge the requirement that
they receive a shave prior to being photographed. Id. at 572. That requirement was held
constitutional by the Second Circuit in Fromer v. Scully, 874 F.2d 69 (2d Cir. 1989).
65 905 F.2d at 577-78.
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authorities and, therefore, not fatal to the legitimacy of the
regulation.6"
Similarly, the court affirmed the district court's holding that
the regulation which prohibited the wearing of Rastafarian
"crowns" satisfied the balancing test and was therefore permissi-
ble. Unlike the Jewish yarmulke and the Islamic Kufi, headgear
permitted by the regulations, Rastafarian crowns are "large and
loose fitting, 6 7 and therefore pose genuine risks as potential
hiding places for contraband. This fact, held the court, not only
justified the prohibition under free exercise balancing, but was a
sufficient distinction from other religious headgear to defeat any
equal protection challenge.6 8
Finally, the court upheld the district court's rejection of the
challenge to prison officials' refusal to provide an Ital diet, con-
sistent with Rastafarian requirements. The court found that the
Ital diet was ill-defined: various individuals and sects within
Rastafarianism imposed different restrictions. The accommoda-
tion of all variations of Ital could well be "administratively in-
feasible" or extremely costly. The court declined to define the
Ital diet to assess the practicality of accommodating it, as prison
authorities do for at least some dietary requirements of Jewish
and Muslim prisoners.69
" Id. at 578.
67 Id. at 579.
e Id.
61 Id. at 579-80.
In general, Rastafarians do not eat meat, and almost universally abstain from
eating pork. Most Rastafarians abstain from alcohol and caffeine. Some Ras-
tafarians do not eat fish, and some refuse dairy products. Some refrain from
eating any foods that have been processed, particularly canned food, believing
that the can symbolizes a coffin, or death. Some Rastafarians refuse to eat veg-
etables that have been cooked for more than a few minutes, believing that
overcooking destroys the food's natural value. Rastafarians also object to vege-
tables that have been treated with non-organic pesticides or fertilizers.
Some Rastafarians will only eat food that is prepared and served in pots
and bowls made of natural materials: more specifically, clay pots and calabash
bowls. Some Rastafarians will eat only food that they have prepared them-
selves. Others refuse food that has been prepared by a woman during her men-
strual period.
708 F. Supp. at 575.
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D. New York State National Organization for Women (NOW)
v. Terry
Although this case did not explicitly deal with a claim under
the religion clauses, it did raise free speech issues with free exer-
cise overtones, and is worth noting as part of the cluster of Sec-
ond Circuit cases under discussion. Randall Terry is an anti-
abortion activist whose organization, Operation Rescue, has
staged many demonstrations and acts of civil disobedience in at-
tempts to interfere with the operation of abortion clinics.70
Many Operation Rescue activists see their opposition to abor-
tion as, at least in part, a religious duty.7 1
The plaintiffs sought and obtained, in New York state
court, a temporary restraining order (TRO) enjoining the de-
fendants from "trespassing on, blocking, [or] obstructing ingress
into or egress from any facility at which abortions are performed
in the City of New York, Nassau, Suffolk or Westchester coun-
ties. ' 72 The underlying lawsuit sought permanent injunctive re-
lief of the same nature. Despite the TRO, the defendants staged
a demonstration outside an abortion clinic "at which several
hundred participants were arrested. '73 At this point, the defend-
ants successfully petitioned to remove the original lawsuit to
federal court based on the federal statutory basis of one of the
plaintiffs' causes of action.74
Judge Ward of the Southern District of New York contin-
ued, in a modified form, the state TRO, and subsequently im-
posed civil contempt sanctions for the defendants' repeated vio-
lations of the order. 5 Ultimately, the district court issued the
permanent injunction sought by the plaintiffs.76 The defendants'
appeal presented, among other issues, the claim that the district
court had improperly limited their First Amendment rights.
70 The history of the specific activities giving rise to this lawsuit are set forth in Now
York State Natl Org. for Women v. Terry, 704 F. Supp. 1247, 1250-53 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
71 One of Terry's two named codefendants was a clergyman, Rev. James P. Lisante.
For a sympathetic profile of Operation Rescue, see Meehan, On the Road with the Res-
cue Movement, 15 HuMAN LIFE REV., Summer 1989, at 7.
72 New York State Nat'l Org. for Women v. Terry, 886 F.2d 1339, 1344 (2d Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2206 (1990).
73 Id.
7' Id. (claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)).
76 Id.
71 Id. at 1345.
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After conceding that the defendants were engaged in politi-
cal speech entitled to full First Amendment protection, the ap-
peals court found the limitations on trespass, obstructing ingress
and egress and "physically obstructing or tortiously harassing"
those entering and leaving the clinics were reasonable time,
place and manner restrictions. The provisions of the TRO were
found to be content-neutral and narrowly tailored to a signifi-
cant government interest and also did not deprive defendants of
alternative means of communication.77 Thus, the First Amend-
ment claim was rejected.
II. THE BACKGROUND: RECENT SUPREME COURT RELIGION
CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE
This term's religion cases in the Second Circuit were de-
cided at a moment of change and uncertainty in the standards
to be applied in such disputes. Tests employed by the Supreme
Court to resolve Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause
cases have been reexamined, revised and even entirely aban-
doned. It is unlikely that this process of change is yet complete.
Certainly with respect to the Establishment Clause, and perhaps
also with respect to the Free Exercise Clause, the Court is likely
to continue to revisit these issues and revise its approach. The
significance of last term's Second Circuit cases cannot be mea-
sured without at least a brief discussion of the background
against which they were decided.
For the last two decades religion clause jurisprudence used
two decisions of the early Burger Court, Lemon v. Kurtzman78
and Wisconsin v. Yoder," as analytical paradigms. In Lemon, an
Establishment Clause challenge to a state program of salary sup-
plements to parochial school teachers teaching in specified secu-
lar subjects, the Court created a three-step Establishment
Clause test. The first two steps, drawn from earlier cases invali-
dating organized prayer and Bible reading in public schools,
were to ascertain whether the purpose and primary effect of a
challenged government practice were secular8 0 If either was not,
" Id. at 1362-64.
78 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (Establishment Clause).
406 U.S. 205 (1972) (Free Exercise Clause).
8O 403 U.S. at 612.
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the statute or practice failed to satisfy the Constitution. 1 The
third step, drawn from an unsuccessful Establishment Clause
challenge to the common practice of exempting religious prop-
erty from taxation,82 stressed the impermissibility of either
church or state directly meddling in each other's internal affairs.
A government practice, even one with a legitimate secular pur-
pose and primary secular effect, violates the Establishment
Clause if it leads to impermissible "entanglement" between
church and state.13
The Lemon test was widely criticized as indeterminate and
therefore potentially too permissive, or, as too restrictive creat-
ing a "Catch-22" paradox between its third prong and its first
two. 4 Particularly in contexts other than those involving pro-
posed government aid to religious schools (the specific type of
question that gave birth to the test), the Lemon standards were
difficult to use when assessing the permissibility of government
action. Not only were they applied with different degrees of
rigor, but occasionally the test was not applied at all. 8
Wisconsin v. Yoder was the high-water mark for judicial
deference to free exercise claims. Before the 1960s the Supreme
Court seemed to employ a relatively simple rule, that is, that the
81 This inquiry was summarized in Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203
(1963):
[W]hat are the purpose and primary effect of the enactment? If either is the
advancement or inhibition of religion then the enactment exceeds the scope of
legislative power as circumscribed by the Constitution. That is to say that to
withstand the strictures of the Establishment Clause there must be a secular
legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits
religion.
Id. at 222.
82 Walz v. Tax Comm'n of New York, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
83 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 619. In Lemon the Court accepted the state's secular purpose
but found that the supervision necessary to assure that the salary supplements would
have a primarily secular effect would violate the nonentanglement requirement.
" Compare, e.g., Fink, The Establishment Clause According to the Supreme Court:
The Mysterious Eclipse of Free Exercise Values, 27 CATH. UL. REv. 207, 209 (1978)
(Establishment Clause jurisprudence under Lemon is too restrictive of religion, and "re-
sults in the denial of true religious liberty to many Americans") with Van Alstyne,
Trends in the Supreme Court: Mr. Jefferson's Crumbling Wall - A Comment on Lynch
v. Donnelly, 1984 DuKe L.J. 770, 786 (Lemon test has been used to justify "a movement
of gradual, secularized Christian ethnocentrism" inconsistent with First Amendment
values).
85 See, e.g., Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983), in which the Court upheld the
use of paid chaplains by the Nebraska legislature* with no reference to the Lemon test,
but rather upon the grounds that history validated the practice.
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Free Exercise Clause protected only belief and expression of be-
lief, and did not extend to conduct 6 Thus, with minor excep-
tions,87 the Free Exercise Clause became largely redundant,
merely a specific restatement of protection of activity also pro-
tected by the Free Speech Clause.88
The 1963 decision of Sherbert v. Verner"9 gave independent
force to the Free Exercise Clause. Sherbert held unconstitu-
tional a state requirement that to be eligible for unemployment
compensation a recipient must be willing to accept jobs requir-
ing Saturday work. The requirement placed the plaintiff, a Sab-
batarian, in the position of having to choose between receiving
compensation and agreeing to compromise a central tenet of her
religion e0 The Court held that when a statute caused "substan-
tial" interference with the practice of religion, the state had to
demonstrate that application of the statute without exception
for the conscientious believer was necessary to protect a "com-
pelling state interest."91
It might be argued that Sherbert made constitutionally sus-
pect only government practices that single out a certain type of
religion disadvantageously. Only those whose day of rest and
worship was Saturday were restricted; Sunday worshippers were
not asked to give up their special day. But in Yoder, the Sher-
bert test was applied to a more clearly neutral statute: Wiscon-
sin's requirement that all children attend school until the age of
sixteen. 2 The Old Order Amish reject formal education beyond
the eighth grade, believing that such education teaches values
inconsistent with the Amish faith, and removes children from
86 See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878) (Free Exercise Clause does
not protect "actions which were in violation of social duties or subversive of good
order.").
E.g., Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (granting religious literature a
constitutionally based exemption from a state tax on published materials that was gener-
ally enforceable despite its impact on nonreligious First Amendment activity).
Thus, religiously motivated expressive activity was protected in cases such as
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), but on grounds that made the religious
nature of the individual's motives irrelevant.
89 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
90 South Carolina required that to be eligible for unemployment compensation a
claimant must accept "available suitable work" unless good cause could be shovm for
declining it. Religious scruples against Saturday work did not constitute "good cause."
Id. at 400-02.
91 Id. at 406.
9, Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 207 (1972).
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the community during "the crucial and formative adolescent pe-
riod of life."'93
Applying strict scrutiny, the Court initially found that the
requirement of high school attendance was a substantial burden
on Amish religious practice.9 4 The Court then found that history
demonstrated that the Amish approach to education was effec-
tive in preparing adolescents for productive adult roles in the
Amish community. Since the asserted state interest in compul-
sory education was precisely preparation for effective adulthood,
the Court held that the state had failed to establish a compelling
interest in applying the requirement of one or two years of high
school to Amish children."'
While criticism of Lemon takes several different forms, crit-
icism of the Yoder test has largely made one point-that Yoder
has been a paper tiger. In the eighteen years following Yoder,
the only context in which free exercise claimants have prevailed
before the Supreme Court has been in unemployment compen-
sation cases substantially similar to Sherbert.9 6 The track record
of free exercise claimants, then, stands in sharp contrast to that
of litigants who have raised colorable claims in other constitu-
tional areas subject to strict scrutiny.9 7 And while some of these
cases presented the Court with situations in which enforcement
of the challenged statute might well have survived strict scru-
9- Id. at 211.
[The Amish] view secondary school education as an impermissible exposure of
their children to a "worldly" influence in conflict with their beliefs. The high
school tends to emphasize intellectual and scientific accomplishments, self-dis-
tinction, competitiveness, worldly success, and social life with other students.
Amish society emphasizes informal learning-through-doing; a life of "good-
ness" rather than a life of intellect; wisdom, rather than technical knowledge;
community welfare, rather than competition; and separation from, rather than
integration with, contemporary worldly society.
Id. High school attendance, the Amish believe, would "endanger their own salvation and
that of their children." Id. at 209.
Id. at 218.
91 Id. at 221-29.
90 See Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (1989); Hobble v.
Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S.
707 (1981).
'1 Since Yoder, the Supreme Court has not sustained a claim of free exercise exemp-
tion outside of the context of unemployment benefits. See, e.g., O'Lone v. Estate of
Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986); Goldman v. Wein-
berger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983);
United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
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tiny,9 8 several others presented state interests that seemed far
short of compelling, or situations in which an exemption would
hardly threaten the state interest at all."" Such inconsistency
has, like the Lemon test, drawn much criticism.100
Significant dissatisfaction with the tests for both religion
clauses led to recent reconsideration of both by the Supreme
Court. In the case of the Establishment Clause, this reconsidera-
tion has been rather cautious and has led to two different pro-
posals, neither of which has yet been clearly endorsed by a ma-
jority of the Justices. The first of these alternatives was
presented by Justice O'Connor in concurring opinions in two
cases, one striking down an Alabama "moment of silence" re-
quirement in public schools10 ' and one permitting a city-spon-
sored Christmas display including a creche among other seasonal
decorations.102
Describing her suggestion as a clarification of, rather than as
an alternative to, Lemon, Justice O'Connor stated that the cen-
tral purposes of the Establishment Clause are twofold. "One is
[to prevent] excessive [government] entanglement with religious
institutions, which may interfere with the independence of the
institutions, give the institutions access to government or gov-
ernmental powerg not fully shared by nonadherents of the reli-
gion, and foster the creation of political constituencies defined
along religious lines. 10 3 The second, not entirely unrelated to
" For example, in Lee, 455 U.S. at 252, the Court rejected claim of religion-bassed
exemption from the social security laws, and in Bowen, 476 U.S. at 693, the Court re-
jected claimant's efforts to prevent the government from making its own internal use of
his family's social security numbers on the ground that granting such clalm might well
impose serious burdens on compelling government interests.
"Perhaps the best example is Goldman, 475 U.S. at 503, in which the Court de-
ferred to the value of uniform military dress code regulations in denying the claim by an
Orthodox Jew of a right to wear a yarmulke while performing his dutie3 as an army
psychologist.
100 See, e.g., Kamenshine, Scrapping Strict Review in Free Exercise Cases, 4 Co.sr.
CommrrARY 147 (1987); Mansfield, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and
the Philosophy of the Constitution, 72 CALiF. L. REv. 847 (1984); Marshall, Solving the
Free Exercise Dilemma: Free Exercise as Expression, 67 MWN. L, Rav. 545 (1983); Pep-
per, Reynolds, Yoder and Beyond: Alternatives for the Free Exercise Clause, 1981 UTAH
L Rv. 309.
101 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 67 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
'-0 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
111 Id. at 687-88. Justice O'Connor cites as an example Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc.,
459 U.S. 116 (1982), which struck down, on Establishment Clause grounds, a zoning ordi-
nance giving churches the rIght to veto tavern permits near those churche3.
1991]
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
the first, is to prevent "government endorsement or disapproval
of religion. Endorsement sends a message to nonadherents that
they are outsiders, not full members of the political community,
and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insid-
ers, favored members of the political community. Disapproval
sends the opposite message." 104 This nonendorsement test has
received much attention, most of it being at least generally posi-
tive. 05 Partly, no doubt, this is because Justice O'Connor's elab-
oration of the test gives some substantive meaning and rationale
to the concept of government neutrality which seemed largely
absent in many Lemon-era rulings. In addition, and this is both
subtle and significant, the test itself satisfies the criteria of neu-
trality and the appearance of neutrality.
Perhaps the only constant factor in most academic sugges-
tions for alternatives to Lemon has been that they are quite ob-
viously meant to move Establishment Clause jurisprudence
clearly toward either a more strict "separationism" or a more
lenient "accommodationism."' ' 0 Adoption of any of these tests
would rightly be seen not merely as an improvement in the pro-
cess of First Amendment analysis but also an obvious shift to-
ward one side of the substantive debate. Both legal commenta-
tors and the general public would likely see such a clear shift as
itself a fundamental statement by the Court about the value of
traditional religion, either "endorsement" or "disapproval."
It is not at all clear that adoption of the nonendorsement
test would lead to a consistent shift in substantive outcomes of
Establishment Clause cases toward either the strict separationist
104 Id. at 688.
101 See, e.g., Dellinger, The Sound of Silence: An Epistle on Prayer and the Consti-
tution, 95 YALE L.J. 1631 (1986); Loewy, Rethinking Government Neutrality Towards
Religion Under the Establishment Clause: The Untapped Potential of Justice
O'Connor's Insight, 64 N.C.L. REV. 1049 (1986); Note, Permissible Accommodations of
Religion: Reconsidering the New York Get Statute, 96 YALE L.J. 1147 (1987). Of course,
not all reaction has been favorable. See, e.g., Smith, Symbols, Perceptions and Doctrinal
Illusions: Establishment Neutrality and the 'No Endorsement' Test, 86 MIcH. L. REV,
266 (1987).
100 Compare, e.g., McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 Sup. CT. REV. 1
(contending that "there exists a class of permissible government actions toward religion,
which have as their purpose and effect the facilitation of religious liberty") with
Goldberg, The Wall of Separation of Church and State, 11 GEO. MASON U.L. RV, 1
(1989) (in which former Justice Arthur Goldberg advocates "far more strict" limitations
on government aid to religion). See also Cord & Ball, The Separation of Church and
State: A Debate, 1987 UTAH L. REV. 895.
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or the accommodationist position. In fact, in the opinions in
which she has expanded on the nonendorsement test, Justice
O'Connor has used it to invalidate a "moment of silence" statute
(a separationist outcome), 10 7 to sustain the display of a creche as
part of a large municipal display celebrating the holiday season
(an accommodationist outcome),10 8 and finally, to declare holi-
day displays by the City of Pittsburgh permissible and imper-
missible, based on the content of the particular display (a clear
victory for neither side)."0 9
This cannot be said of the alternative proposed by Justice
Kennedy in his separate opinion in County of Allegheny v.
ACLU. 110 To Kennedy the crucial question is whether the gov-
ernment has used "government's power to coerce. . . to further
[religious] interests," or whether it has "proselytize[d]" or "con-
tributed significant amounts of tax money to serve the cause of
one religious faith." ' At least in certain cases, particularly
those involving "passive symbols" maintained by private parties
on government property, adoption of this test would shift the
balance of Establishment Clause jurisprudence clearly toward
the "accommodationist" position. Justice Kennedy obviously be-
lieves that his test would make these questions more determi-
nate; his harshest criticism of Justice O'Connor's proposal is its
inability to lead to clear answers.112
Justice Kennedy's test surely does make outcomes determi-
nate in cases involving "passive" symbols of the Christmas sea-
son. The courthouse creche display in Allegheny, a case that
might be expected to make all but the most consistent accom-
modationist at least hesitate, passes the test with flying colors.
Yet, beyond the question of Christmas displays, is the "coer-
cion" or "proselytization" test really more determinate than the
nonendorsement test? Justice Kennedy cites, with approval,
landmark cases prohibiting organized prayer and bible reading
in public schools, even when the school permits individual chil-
W0 allace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 67 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
1 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
10, County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 623 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring). See notes 29-31 and accompanying text supra.
110 492 U.S. at 655 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
11 Id. at 664.
n2 Id. at 669-77.
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dren to opt out of the exercise. 113 Why should these practices be
regarded as clearly more coercive than the Pittsburgh creche
display? And what about the practice of the Nebraska legisla-
ture in paying a permanent chaplain to deliver invocations
before legislative sessions? 114 Is this state proselytization or di-
rect financial contribution to propogation of a particular reli-
gious viewpoint? Rigorous application would seem to invalidate
such legislative practice, but Justice Kennedy is clearly not in-
clined to overturn Marsh v. Chambers."15
While this is not to suggest that Justice Kennedy's coercion
test could not be made consistent with most or all Establish-
ment Clause precedent, it does indicate that the standard of
"coercion" or "proselytization" leaves enormous room for ex-
actly the same kind of uncertainty created by the use of the
nonendorsement test. The only way to provide certainty would
be to define "coercion" as limited to actual legal compulsion and
to limit "proselytization" to something very close to the creation
of a state-sponsored church. It is unlikely that Justice Kennedy
intends to move Establishment Clause jurisprudence that far to-
ward the accommodationist pole." 8
Still, it is likely that, in practice, Justice Kennedy's test
would be somewhat more determinate than Justice O'Connor's.
This cannot be determined from merely comparing the words
employed by the competing tests, but rather by looking at the
full opinions in which they appear. Justice Kennedy states that
113 Id. at 661 n.1 ("The prayer invalidated in [Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962)]
was unquestionably coercive in an indirect manner .... "). Justice Kennedy also con-
cedes that "an obstrusive year-round religious display would place government's weight
behind an obvious effort to proselytize on behalf of a particular religion." Id. at 661. Is
this merely another way to define "endorsement"?
11' Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983). See note 85 supra.
115 492 U.S. at 663-66. Justice Kennedy would find legislative prayer noncoercive.
Perhaps it is, and distinguishable from school prayer by the age and suggestibility of the
audience. But why is such prayer, even if noncoercive, not proselytization? Proselytiza-
tion, to be such, need not be effective. Does Justice Kennedy mean to bar noncoercive
proselytization only in contexts in which it is likely to be effective? If so, his proposal
may be strikingly similar to Professor Jesse Choper's suggested revision of Lemon to
prohibit government actions that are both intended and likely to have the effect of influ-
encing religious choice. See Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Rec-
onciling the Conflict, 410 U. Prr. L. REV. 673 (1980). Whether this is a better test than
nonendorsement may be debatable, but in any event it is hard to see how it is a clearly
more determinate test.
16 See note 113 and accompanying text supra.
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prevailing Establishment Clause jurisprudence goes beyond neu-
trality to denigrate religion by invalidating "our strong tradition
of government accommodation and acknowledgement" of such
beliefs. 117 The inference can easily be drawn that the author of
that sentence would consistently decide close cases in favor of
accommodation. In contrast, Justice O'Connor's opinions do not
suggest a consistent tilt toward either the separationist or ac-
commodationist position. Not only has the nonendorsement test
led to outcomes that have displeased adherents of both posi-
tions, but the source of criticism of the test has largely shifted.
When first put forward it drew criticism as insufficiently separa-
tionist; now it has become the target of attacks by the Court's
accommodationists.1 8 Thus, although the Lemon test is still
cited and given some deference,119 it seems, except to a small
group of strict separationists, to be somewhat like a family patri-
117 Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 664.
118 In Lynch v. Donnelly, 465'U.S. 668 (1984), the dissenting opinions criticize Jus-
tice O'Connor, who provided the fifth vote to uphold the Pawtucket crkehe. Justice
Brennan was troubled by her willingness to allow government "acknowledgements,"
short of endorsement, of religion, 465 U.S. at 713-17 (Brennan, J., dissenting), Justice
Blackmun chided Justice O'Connor for lax application of Lemon, 465 U.S. at 726-27
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). An article of mine approving the nonendorsement test,
Beschle, The Conservative As LiberaL The Religion Clauses, Liberal Neutrality and the
Approach of Justice O'Connor, 62 NomE DAmE L, Rxv. 151 (1987), was cited by Profe3-
sor Howard Ball, disapprovingly, as standing in the accommodationist camp. Cord &
Ball, supra note 106, at 920-21.
In Allegheny Justice Kennedy strongly attacks nonendorsement as leading to
"[o]bsessive, implacable resistance to all but the most carefully scripted and secularized
forms of accommodation." 492 U.S. at 677-78. In fact, in an opinion joined by the "ac-
commodationist" wing of the Court, he suggests that he finds the nonendorsement test
even more offensive than strict separationism, since the latter is more consistent. 492
U.S. at 678-79 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). This statement,
and the level of hostility reflected toward the nonendorsement test is striking, given the
fact that earlier in his opinion, Justice Kennedy seems to employ his own nonendorse-
ment test to refute strict separationism: "A categorical approach would install federal
courts as jealous guardians of an absolute 'wall of separation', sending a clear message of
disapproval." Id. at 657 (emphasis added). Justice Kennedy's statement on the relative
merits of nonendorsement and strict separationism is striking evidence of the value that
he appears to place on certainty and predictability, even at the expense of accommoda-
tionist outcomes.
1,9 Justice O'Connor has described the nonendorsement test as merely a "clarifica-
tion" of Lemon. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687 (O'Connor, J., concurring). In Mueller v. Allen,
463 U.S. 388, 394 (1983), the Court, cautioning that Lemon "provide3 'no more than [a]
helpful signpos[t],"' still purports to apply it. See also Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38,
55-56 (1985) (stating that Lemon would be applied, and that part of Lemon is the ques-
tion of nonendorsement).
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arch on his deathbed, spoken of with respect, but not taken all
that seriously, while potential heirs jockey for position with an
eye toward the inevitable passing. The possibility that Lemon
will be followed by a test more clearly aligned with strict separa-
tionism seems extremely slight; with the departures of Justices
Brennan and Marshall, only Justice Stevens can be classified as
a consistent, predictable separationist. 20 In starkly pragmatic
terms, it would seem wise for separationists to reconsider the
virtues of the nonendorsement test; that test and Justice Ken-
nedy's more accommodationist coercion test seem to be the clear
contenders for the future Establishment Clause analysis model.
If the future of Establishment Clause jurisprudence is un-
clear, the future of the Free Exercise Clause was charted so
unambiguously, but at the same time so unexpectedly, in 1990,
that observers must wonder whether the new direction of free
exercise analysis can possibly be what it seems to be. Despite
widespread criticism of recent free exercise decisions, few ex-
pected that the Court would use Employment Div., Dep't of
Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith 2 ' to completely rework
free exercise jurisprudence. Both parties maintained that ex-
isting precedent provided ample support for their positions.122
The narrow issue presented by Smith was whether Native
American religionists, whose practices have for many years in-
cluded sacramental use of peyote, are entitled, by virtue of the
Free Exercise Clause, to an exemption from generally applicable
state statutes prohibiting the use of mind-altering drugs.23
"Io See 492 U.S. at 646-55 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens' separationism is
so strong that it turns up even in quite unexpected places. See Webster v. Reproductive
Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 560-72 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part), in which he suggests that a statute is invalid if its goal is grounded in religious
beliefs.
's' 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990). See note 3 and accompanying text supra.
In the state court proceedings, Oregon had maintained that it had adopted a
practice narrowly tailored to a compelling state interest. Smith v. Employment Div., 301
Or. 209, 721 P.2d 445 (1986), vacated, 110 S. Ct. 1595, reh'g denied, 110 S. Ct. 2605
(1990). Justice O'Connor would have upheld the state's position on those grounds, 110 S.
Ct. at 1606-15 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Earlier state and federal court decisions apply-
ing strict scrutiny were divided on the question of free exercise protection for the sacra-
mental use of peyote. See Brown, Religion: The Psychedelic Perspective: The Freedom
of Religion Defense, 11 Am. INDIAN L. REv. 125 (1983).
12 Respondents had not been convicted under the Oregon criminal statute, On. REv.
STAT. § 475.992(4) (1989), but rather had been dismissed from their jobs as employees of
a private drug rehabilitation organization based upon their sacramental use of peyote
[Vol, 57: 547
RELIGION CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE
Given current public attitudes on illegal drug use, it seemed a
safe bet that the Court would refuse to recognize such a right,
but given prior free exercise cases, it also seemed safe to assume
that the Court could and would do so while still applying the
strict scrutiny standard of Yoder. Instead, thirty years of free
exercise law was dismantled.
Justice Scalia, writing for a five-member majority, seriously
narrowed the commonly accepted view of the scope of the
clause. Citing the Court's earliest free exercise cases, he held
that the clause was principally aimed at protecting beliefs, not
actions.124 It would protect action only where the state's motive
in banning or compelling it was hostility to the religious motiva-
tion behind, or message conveyed by, the act.12 5 As Scalia him-
self points out, no such case has ever been presented to the Su-
preme Court; as Justice O'Connor points out in her concurring
opinion, Scalia's test makes the Free Exercise Clause largely a
restatement of the due process requirement that government ac-
tion have a rational (that is, secularly defensible) basis. 2 ' Scalia
does not acknowledge that the Court is seriously altering free
exercise law; rather he states that "we have never held that an
individual's religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an
otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to
regulate.112 7 All prior cases which appeared to do just that were
described as "hybrid situation[s]" in which free exercise was
merely a distraction from the genuinely determinative claim.
This is, no doubt, a plausible description of the cases from the
1930s and 1940s involving religiously motivated free speech
and were subsequently denied unemployment compensation under a provision of state
law denying benefits to those dismissed for work-related misconduct. 110 S. Ct. at 1597-98.
1 "The free exercise of religion means, first and foremost, the right to believe and
profess whatever religious doctrine one desires." 110 S. Ct. at 1599.
Laws are made for the government of actions, and while they cannot interfere
with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with practices.... Can a
man excuse his practices to the contrary because of his religious belief?. To
permit this would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief supe-
rior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law
unto himself.
Id. at 1600 (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1879)).
11 110 S. Ct. at 1599.
12 110 S. Ct. at 1608 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
127 110 S. Ct. at 1600.
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claims, 128 but it is far from the common understanding of
Yoder.12e To Scalia, Yoder is a case about "the right of parents
...to direct the education of their children." 130 Finally, Sher-
bert and its progeny are seen as creating a special exception, not
involving a government decision to regulate conduct generally,
but rather only to regulate unemployment compensation pro-
grams, which "invite consideration" of individual circum-
stances.131 In short, the rule that unwillingness to violate reli-
gious principles may not serve as a rigid bar to eligibility for
unemployment compensation survives, but it may have the same
relevance to the rest of First Amendment law as the holding that
professional baseball is not interstate commerce for purposes of
the Sherman Act has to the rest of antitrust law.1 32
Under a test that subjects only the law itself, rather than
the failure to provide an exemption, to scrutiny, and asks only
whether it is rational and does not violate other constitutional
commands, some truly remarkable conclusions seem warranted.
A state or local prohibition on alcoholic beverages need not ex-
empt sacramental wine;133 government may prohibit liturgically
mandated alterations to the interior of a church by designating
the sanctuary a landmark to be preserved under zoning restric-
tions; and laws prohibiting gender discrimination in employ-
228 E.g., Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943); West Virginia Bd. of Educ.
v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
129 See notes 93-95 and accompanying text supra.
180 110 S. Ct. at 1601. On this point, Justice Scalia also cites Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
131 110 S. Ct. at 1603.
132 See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972). The exemption, based on grounds of
stare decisis, has had no effect on the Court's classification of other professional sports as
having an effect on interstate commerce, and therefore falling within the jursdiction of
the Sherman Act. See Haywood v. National Basketball Ass'n, 401 U.S. 1204 (1971);
Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957); United States v. Interna-
tional Boxing Club, 348 U.S. 236 (1955).
"I2 The Smith dissenters point out that the National Prohibition Act, §3, 41 Stat.
308, contained an exemption for sacramental wine. 27 U.S.C. § 1 (1919), repealed by ch.
740, § 1, 49 Stat. 872. They suggest that even had such an exemption not been incorpo-
rated into the statute, it would have been constitutionally compelled. 110 S. Ct. at 1618
n.6 (Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan and Marshall, JJ.).
12' See generally Rector, Wardens, and Members of St. Bartholomew's Church v.
City of New York, 728 F. Supp. 958 (S.D.N.Y.), afl'd, 914 F.2d 348 (1990) (landmark
restrictions upheld where church wanted to replace existing structure); Orthodox Minyan
of Elkins Park v. Cheltenham Township Zoning Hearing Bd., 123 Pa. Commw. 29, 652
A.2d 772 (1989) (court found that zoning board's denial of special exception to convert
residential property to synagogue was arbitrary and invalid).
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ment need not exempt churches, even in their choice of clergy.1 35
Scalia's response is to direct those seeking exemptions to
the legislature. 36 Here the fit between Smith and Justice Ken-
nedy's more lenient approach to the Establishment Clause be-
comes evident. The clear implication of Scalia's suggestion of
legislative redress is that exemptions from general duties created
by the legislature will be valid, that is, will not themselves vio-
late the Establishment Clause. 37 If they do, then the option of
legislative exemptions becomes illusory. With Yoder understood
as commanding government to permit, in some cases, religious-
based exemptions from general duties, the Establishment Clause
issue was easily resolved. In Lemon terms, the secular purpose
and effect of this exemption was compliance with the mandate
of the Free Exercise Clause.1 38 With that response unavailable, is
it clear that legislative exemptions present no constitutional
problems?
Clearly, an exemption or pattern of exemptions that favors
a particular religion, and is not extended to analogous claims
based on secular moral grounds raises questions under the
nonendorsement test. But, as discussed above, Scalia and Ken-
nedy favor a test that draws the constitutional line at coercion
or proselytization. 39 An exemption, it might be said, is merely
an accommodation, not in any way a coercive act. But exemp-
tions might easily be seen to generate some sort of pressure.
Take, for instance, the most historically prominent of such ex-
113 Compare Rayburn v. General Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d
1164 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1020 (1986) (prohibition on gender discrimi-
nation cannot be applied to church's choice of ministers and analogous personnel) with
EEOC v. Pacific Press Publishing Ass'n, 676 F.2d 1272 (9th Cir. 1982) (statutes prohibit-
ing gender bias do apply to churches when choosing employees not in clergy or decision-
making positions).
" 110 S. Ct at 1606: "[A] society that believes in the negative protection accorded
to religious belief can be expected to be solicitous of that value in its legislation....
But to say that a nondiscriminatory religious-practice exemption is permitted, or even
that it is desirable, is not to say that it is constitutionally required ......
17 Id. The characterization of a question of special treatment for religion as
presenting primarily a question of free exercise or one of Establishment Clause concern
can be crucial in determining the outcome. The classic example may be tax exemptions
for religious property. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970); note 83 and accom-
panying text supra.
1 See notes 78-85 and accompanying text supra.
" See notes 110-18 and accompanying text supra.
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emptions, that for conscientious objectors to military service. 140
If such an exemption were limited to certain denominations with
an unambiguous history of pacifism,' 4' would that influence
some with antiwar views to join those churches, and would that
influence be "coercion"? 142 Analogous examples might be gener-
ated, even in the specific area at issue in Smith, that is, drug
use. Would a legislative exemption for adherents of Native
American religions influence some to adopt those beliefs, and if
so, is that coercion?143 It does not seem implausible that at least
some legislative exemptions might run afoul of even a reasona-
bly accommodationist view of the Establishment Clause.
The second, and perhaps more striking, problem with the
Scalia suggestion is that it quite obviously is a more feasible op-
tion for members of religions that command the allegiance of
large numbers of voters, and less so for minority faiths. Justice
Kennedy, in Allegheny, criticized the nonendorsement test as
quite possibly giving greater leeway to accommodate minority
faiths than those that are dominant in the community. He noted
that a reasonable observer, informed of the demographics of,
say, Pittsburgh, could not conclude from the display of a meno-
rah on city property that it was a community in which non-Jews
240 See generally Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, reh'g denied sub nom.
Negre v. Larsen, 402 U.S. 934 (1971); Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970);
United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965); Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61
(1946), overruling United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605 (1931).
141 In Gillette the Court rejected the claim that the statutory limitation of conscien-
tious objector status to those who object to "war in any form," thereby disqualifying
those who object to a particular war as unjust, violated the Constitution. The Court fi-
nessed the contention that certain types of religion had been singled out for favorable
treatment by saying that the inquiry focuses on the consistent pacifism of the individual
and whether it springs from religious conviction, not on the consistent pacifism of the
religious group to which the individual belongs. Gillette, 401 U.S. at 451. Thus, had Gil-
lette adhered to a consistent pacifism which he derived from his Catholicism, he would
not have lost his status as a conscientious objector simply because his opposition to war
went beyond the "just war" tenet of his church.
14I See notes 110-18 and accompanying text supra.
143 It would seem very likely that one factor behind the reluctance to exempt any
form of drug use, on religious grounds, from general prohibitions is the suspicion that It
will lead to an unmanageable number of insincere professions of religious belief to pro-
tect illegal behavior. See Brown, supra note 122, at 137-43, discussing cases in which the
defense of sacramental use was invoked by defendants not members of the Native Amer-
ican Church, and sometimes not members of any recognized church at all, following the
California Supreme Court's exemption from crimial prosecution of peyote use by mem-
bers of the Native American Church in People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40
Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964).
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were excluded from full civic participation. On the other hand, a
cross displayed under the same circumstances might be reasona-
bly perceived as Pittsburgh proclaiming itself a Christian city.'
4
'
Justice Kennedy is wary of any test that will not, in practice,
treat all religions equally.
Yet, by joining Justice Scalia's opinion in Smith, Kennedy
endorsed a test that plainly has a disparate effect on different
religions. The invitation to religious groups to seek legislative
exemption stands on its head the insight of Carolene Products'"°
and the work of structuralists such as John Hart Ely.16 Justice
Kennedy is upset that the nonendorsement test might disadvan-
tage religious groups with substantial electoral power yet is un-
concerned that Smith disadvantages those without such power.
Contrary to decades of constitutional law, the religion clauses
are interpreted by Justice Kennedy in a way that provides spe-
cial protection for those least in need of it.
Perhaps this overstates Smith's endorsement of legislative
exemptions. It may be that the exemptions envisioned would
have to be framed without explicit denominational favoritism.
Surely, giving an exemption from a general prohibition of alco-
hol to only Roman Catholic churches, and not to other denomi-
nations that also use sacramental wine, would be impermissible.
Yet Smith does not provide a principle to limit the availability
of legislative exemptions, and neither does the noncoercion stan-
dard of Justice Kennedy's Establishment Clause approach." 7
14 See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 616 n.64 (1989), in which Jus-
tice Blackmun refers to the fact that the Jewish population of Pittsburgh is only slightly
over 10% as relevant to the determination of whether a reasonable observer would derive
a message of endorsement or one of pluralism from the menorah in that case.
145 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938). The case is best
known for its famous footnote 4, which suggested that a level of scrutiny beyond the
"rational basis" test might be appropriate in three types of cases: first, "when legislation
appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those
of the first ten amendments"; second, when "legislation ... restricts those political
processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legisla-
tion"; finally, when "statutes [are] directed at particular religious... national... or
racial minorities. . . ." Id. at 152 n.4.
146 J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DmRuS .A THEORY OF JUDicuL PREvw (1980). Dean
Ely here constructs probably the most influential and elaborate defense of the use of
judicial review to achieve "representation - reinforcing" ends, among them to insure that
minorities are not systematically denied the came protections secured by majoritie3
through the democratic process.
,47 See notes 110-18 and accompanying text supra.
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These flaws in Smith have hardly gone unnoticed. Justice
O'Connor, in her concurring opinion, and three dissenting Jus-
tices strongly criticize the abandonment of strict scrutiny.148 The
very presence of these strong objections may indicate that Smith
is likely to endure; Smith was a deliberate step over forceful op-
position, not merely a thoughtless misstep. Still, if the Court
can, with a collective straight face, present Smith as consistent
with Yoder, 149 perhaps modification of Smith might also be pos-
sible, if presented as entirely consistent with precedent. Thus,
the Supreme Court has seriously altered Free Exercise Clause
jurisprudence in the last year and seems poised to at least mod-
ify Establishment Clause analysis in the near future. Against
this background, we return to the cases decided last term by the
Second Circuit. How consistent are they with this new thinking
regarding the religion clauses? To what extent do they illustrate
the reasons for such changes? And most significantly, what do
they augur for the future? Specifically, might they suggest some
ways out of the dilemmas posed by current doctrine?
III. THE FUTURE: WHAT CAN WE LEARN FROM LAST TERM'S
CASES?
Last term's Second Circuit religion clause decisions can be
evaluated in several ways. The two traditional inquiries would
14" Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1606-13 (O'Connor, J., concurring); 110 S. Ct. at 1615-16
(Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan and Marshall, JJ.).
149 110 S. Ct. at 1601, 1601 n.1 (Yoder involved Free Exercise claim in connection
with "other constitutional protections"). In a 1988 commencement address at McGeorge
School of Law, University of the Pacific, Justice Kennedy quoted the argument of
Yoder's counsel before the Supreme Court:
My argument ... will pursue two points. One, the free exercise claim, and
secondly, the question of danger to interests of the state ....
We're talking about a whole complex of religious interests: religious inter-
ests in rights, in education, and in worship; in parental nurture and individual
religious choice; in vocation and communal association with respect to teaching
and learning, and with respect to privacy .... [I]ndeed, we're talking about
... the continued existence of the Amish faith community in the United
States.
Kennedy, The Three R's of the Law: Reason, Rhetoric and Respect, McGEoa MAGA.
ZiNE 1989, at 33, 35 (quoting opening argument in Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)). It Is
difficult to maintain that those trost involved in the case did not see it as one primarily
about free exercise. Although Justice Kennedy presented the quote as an illustration of
powerful rhetoric, without explicitly endorsing its substance, this commencement ad-
dress does seem to imply that, in 1988, he shared that understanding of the substance of
Yoder.
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be to explore whether they were correct in a positivist sense,
that is, consistent with controlling precedent, or to ask whether
they were correct in a normative sense, that is, whether they em-
body a view of what the clauses should command. Each of these
questions is of some interest, although the value of the positivist
question is reduced by the shifting standards supplied by the
Supreme Court for use in these cases. But if the dynamic nature
of religion clause standards makes the positivist question less in-
teresting, it highlights a third way to examine these cases. What
do they tell us about the future, about where religion clause ju-
risprudence is headed, why it is moving in that direction, and
whether alternative courses are possible and preferable?
A. The Establishment Clause
Kaplan may be a significant case, but for reasons likely to
displease Judges Feinberg and Lumbard. It may prove to be a
pyrrhic victory for advocates of strict separation. As discussed in
Part II, the Justices inclined to use Lemon to reach consistent
separationist outcomes are now a minority and, with the depar-
ture of Justice Marshall, likely to be even less influential in the
future.150 The Court is likely to adopt either Justice O'Connor's
nonendorsement test, or Justice Kennedy's noncoercion and
nonproselytization test.'51 Of the two, nonendorsement seems
clearly closer to the separationist position. Kaplan itself indi-
cates that, at least in cases involving the display of religious
symbols, the nonendorsement test can be used to reach separa-
tionist ends more easily than the noncoercion test.
However, the Second Circuit's invocation of the nonen-
dorsement test in barring the menorah in Kaplan may provide
evidence for those who criticize the test as being unacceptably
indeterminate, and, more specifically, see such indeterminacy as
a weapon to be unduly employed against all forms of accommo-
dation.15 2 Of course, indeterminacy is not necessarily a fatal flaw;
much of constitutional law consists of general rules that leave
much leeway in application to specific situations. The tension
between the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses may make
a certain degree of unpredictability the only alternative to rules
10 See note 120 and accompanying text supra.
151 See notes 101-18 and accompanying text supra.
See text accompanying note 112 supra.
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that, while clear, seriously undervalue one or another of these
First Amendment concerns. But if flexibility leads to outcomes
that seem to strain too much to enforce separationism, Justice
Kennedy's critique of the nonendorsement test is likely to gain
adherents.
Both Allegheny and Lynch stress the importance of the
context in which a religious display on public property is viewed.
But surely the question of whether the display, in context, con-
veys government endorsement cannot be reduced to asking
whether the scene includes, in the same visual frame, a secular
symbol to balance the religious message. Context includes sev-
eral other things, among them the nature of the forum. Had the
city granted a type of access to the menorah that went beyond
that which would be available to analagous nonreligious dis-
plays, the conclusion that it endorsed the message would be
quite proper. But it is extremely difficult to see, in the absence
of any evidence that Lubavitch of Vermont was given access to
City Hall Park unavailable to others, how Burlington has en-
dorsed any value beyond equal access to the public forum. Al-
though it is true that a casual observer, unfamiliar with the his-
tory of use of the park, might draw an incorrect conclusion of
religious endorsement, the same could be said about a visitor to
a university building who comes upon a room in which a reli-
gious student group is meeting. 1 3 But an observer who is rea-
sonably informed about government's policies of equal access
should perceive no more than an endorsement of pluralism.
Surely, the nonendorsement test depends and should depend on
the latter perception, r.ather than the former.
Yet in Kaplan the court seemed to place undue weight on
the perceptions of the uninformed, and perhaps also the unrea-
sonable, viewer. While we may assume that those objecting to
the display were, for the most part, acting from a genuine com-
mitment to separation of church and state, is it likely that they
actually took the menorah to signify that Jews were politically
privileged in Burlington, and that the city regarded its non-Jew-
ish majority as "outsiders"? 5 4 Even more troubling than the ap-
"' See Widmer v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (holding that free exercise principles
demand that religious student groups not be excluded from access to university facilities
made available to analogous nonreligious groups).
18 See notes 103-04 and accompanying text supra.
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parent overvaluing of the likely reactions only of the uninformed
or unreasonable is the distinct possibility that the reactions of
the intolerant were also given substantial weight. The district
court found that at least some of the objections to the menorah
were openly anti-semitic; 155 some observers took offense, not at
the appearance of government favoritism, but rather at the fact
that Lubavitch and its display had any sort of place in Burling-
ton. It is quite disturbing that intolerance might, however inad-
vertently, be the beneficiary of a decision purporting to enforce
the constitutional provision most clearly meant to protect reli-
gious tolerance.
Kaplan, then, appears to misread Allegheny in at least one
of two ways. It overvalues the perceptions of the least informed
and least reasonable observers, and it seems to try to distill the
subtleties of the nonendorsement test in cases involving religious
displays to a clear rule that religious symbols are always forbid-
den except when an analogous secular symbol is very close by.
The first of these analytical errors strains nonendorsement be-
yond its boundaries as defined by Justice O'Connor and seems
almost calculated to demonstrate that the test is malleable
enough to serve strict separationist ends as well as any prior Es-
tablishment Clause formula. The second, apparently seeking to
provide a clear standard, produces one so artificial as to again
cast doubt on the viability of anything other than Justice Ken-
nedy's accommodationism.
Four Supreme Court Justices have endorsed the position
that essentially all "passive" holiday displays do not violate the
Establishment Clause. 156 With the departure of Justices Bren-
nan and Marshall, only one Justice remains who has been con-
151 Kaplan v. City of Burlington, 700 F. Supp. at 1321 n.7; see notes 18-19 and ac-
companying text supra.
15 Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 660-63 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and White and Scalia, JJ.). Only in an "extreme case,"
such as "the permanent erection of a large Latin cross on the roof of city hall," would a
passive display become an act of coercion or proselytization. Id. at 661. One can have
enormous fun with this language, of course. What about the permanent erection of a
small Latin cross? A cross on the side of city hall? Justice Kennedy cites, apparently
with approval, Friedman v. Board of County Comm'rs, 781 F.2d 777 (10th Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1169 (1986), invalidating the use of a Latin cross on a county seal.
This may constitute endorsement; is it clear that it reaches the level of coercion? Once
again, the false sense of predictability is evident. Only by adopting an absolute rule can
certainty be achieved, and Justice Kennedy, quite correctly, shies away from this.
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sistently opposed to such displays. 157 Thus, if either Justice
O'Connor or Justice Blackmun were to agree with the foregoing
analysis of Kaplan, a majority of the Court would be assembled
to label it "wrong" in the positivist sense. But such labeling is
less important than the impact Kaplan, and any decisions fol-
lowing it, in the Second Circuit or elsewhere, might have as the
Supreme Court decides whether the future of Establishment
Clause analysis will see adoption of nonendorsement or noncoer-
cion as the principal standard.
The future of the Establishment Clause will largely depend
on the views of Justice Souter, whose views on the religion
clauses are untested, and Justice Thomas." 8 While it is possible
that these Justices may prove to be strict separationists, the fact
that their political sponsors surely are not makes it unlikely. If
Justices who have yet to align themselves with the nonendorse-
ment or noncoercion camps see nonendorsement as a standard
that will allow, as Justice O'Connor has stated, government to
recognize the presence and even the value of religion in a plural-
ist society while at the same time denying it privileged status,
then there is every reason to believe that nonendorsement will
prevail. But if nonendorsement is seen as impermissibly indeter-
minate, or worse, permitting the articulation of specific applica-
tions placing religions in the position of having fewer rights than
analogous nonreligious views, the alternative of noncoercion will
become more attractive. This is because indeterminacy itself is
seen as unacceptable, or more specifically, because it contains
the potential for use for strict separationist ends. Kaplan's insis-
tence that the public square, both literal and figurative, be free
from religious symbols does nothing to assuage the concerns of
those who find nonendorsement unacceptable. The battle of the
Burlington menorah has been won by the separationist camp,
but in a way which, I fear, may make it somewhat more likely
that those most committed to accommodationism will ultimately
I"7 See 492 U.S. at 637-46 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting in part); id. at
646-55 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting in part).
'18 During his confirmation hearings, Justice Thomas spoke briefly but favorably
about Justice O'Connor's nonendorsement test. Hearing of the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee Afternoon Session, Sept. 10, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis library, Federal
News Service file ("I think it is an important departure from prior approaches and it's
one that anyone who approaches these cases should be concerned about or at least be
watchful for.").
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win the war over the future of the Establishment Clause.
At the same time, it may be possible to draw on last term's
Second Circuit cases to illustrate that the adoption of a noncoer-
cion test would provide little, if any, more certainty than the
nonendorsement test. The Establishment Clause claim in Ther-
iault is an excellent example of the difficulty of deciding when
coercion begins. If the allegations of Theriault's Establishment
Clause claim are based upon fact, then the participation of a
priest, minister or rabbi in prison discipline or in evaluating an
inmate's eligibility for parole or other benefits, considering that
at the same time the chaplain's primary duty is to provide reli-
gious guidance, warrants serious examination. It is by no means
clear that this examination will vary, either in its difficulty or its
outcome, based on whether the question is posed as one of
nonendorsement or noncoercion.
What has happened when the state goes beyond making a
chaplain available to inmates and vests the chaplain with non-
trivial disciplinary or evaluative duties? Has there been an en-
dorsement of the chaplain's religion or religion in general, in
that a reasonable observer would think that a visible adherent of
the chaplain's faith is likely to gain advantage, to be an "in-
sider"? Does the fact that a chaplain may have coercive power
on secular matters lend the state's coercive power to his religious
activities? Does it make the chaplain's proselytization the state's
proselytization? 159 More importantly, are the questions substan-
tially different? Is one more pliable than the other? This is not
to say that there is no difference in the way the tests would be
applied by their authors. The tone of their opinions in Alle-
gheny and elsewhere would lead one to expect that Justice Ken-
nedy would be at least more likely to require some evidence of
actual religious motivation by a chaplain in exercising secular
duties, while Justice O'Connor would be more likely to focus on
the inmates' suspicions and the uniquely coercive atmosphere of
the prison.!60 But there is nothing in the language or logic of the
noncoercion test which suggests that it could not be stretched toinclude subtle "coercion," which might otherwise be described as
119 See notes 38-40 and accompanying text supra.
1eo Thus, Justice O'Connor's test includes both a principle of actual ab3ence of en-
tanglement, and the absence of a message of endorsement. See notes 103-04 and accom-
panying text supra.
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endorsement.
Whatever the future of the Establishment Clause, it is un-
likely to include a great deal of certainty. Application of the
clause becomes easy only if it is simplified in a way that fails to
acknowledge the complexity of the contemporary relationship
between law and religion. In a world in which law claims the
power to pervade more and more aspects of everyday life, and in
which both our understanding of religion"'1 as well as the reli-
gious diversity of our communities are expanding, glib references
to a "wall of separation" are remarkably unhelpful. But at the
same time, to draw the line of impermissibility narrowly around
the most clearly coercive practices threatens the central com-
mand of neutrality contained in the First Amendment. The
challenge to those who believe in the continued vitality of the
clause is to help develop the potential of the nonendorsement
test. Perhaps Theriault, as it moves through the court system,
will provide a vehicle for doing this. Kaplan, though, would ap-
pear to have been singularly unhelpful.
B. The Free Exercise Clause
While neither Theriault nor Terry presented unique free
exercise issues, or articulated significant new First Amendment
law, the cases are not without some interest. They stand as ex-
cellent examples of the kinds of claims that must have disturbed
Justice Scalia and others in the Smith majority 162 and led them
to reject the indeterminacy of any sort of balancing test, even at
the cost of possible evisceration of the Free Exercise Clause. De-
spite the honor paid by history to Gandhi, King and others,6 3 a
perceived increase in the amount of civil disobedience must be
profoundly disturbing to a society, in some ways more so than
merely an increase in the incidence of crime. Even while violat-
"I Religion itself has undergone a change since the eighteenth century world of the
framers. See Bellah, Religious Evolution, 29 AM. Soc. REV. 358 (1964). This has caused
frequent problems for courts faced with the need to address the issue of whether a belief
system is a religion. See, e.g., Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970); United States
v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965); Africa v. Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d 1025 (3d Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 456 U.S. 908 (1982); Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197 (3d Cir. 1979).
162 See notes 121-32 and accompanying text supra.
'13 For a collection of American documents on civil disobedience, from the colonial
era to the 1970s, see CWL DIsOBEDIENCE IN AMERICA. A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (D.
Weber ed. 1978).
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ing social norms, most criminals do not fundamentally call the
legitimacy of the norm into question. The thief, even the mur-
derer, however their actions shock us, do not make us question
our opposition to robbery or murder. Indeed, even the criminal
is likely to accept, perhaps even insist on, enforcement of the
norm for his benefit, against other potential or actual
transgressors.
But when laws are broken under a claim of right, something
more profound is happening. The norm itself, perhaps society's
entire system of norms, is called into question. Society must
confront the claim that its legal system is, if not invalid, at least
subordinate to some other set of values. If there is general con-
sensus regarding the worth of that other set of values, and if the
list of those types of claims that are recognized as superior to
those of positive law is short, accommodation of these claims of
right may pose little threat to the overall system of social norms.
Indeed, recognition of such claims may strengthen respect for a
legal system that acknowledges its own limits.
When the number of challenges to the legal system is seen
as increasing, and the challenges are made on the basis of a wide
assortment of religious doctrines, some far out of the main-
stream of Western religious tradition,16' they become far more
unsettling. The challenger is no longer perceived as fulfilling his
or her duty to a higher power by adhering to a norm that, while
not held by the entire community, is at least understood by
most in the community to be roughly analogous to their own
commitments. Rather, the fact that the claim may not be en-
dorsed by any traditional religious community but might be en-
tirely personal,16 5 and that it may seem substantively bizarre,
may lead many observers to suspect that the conscientious ob-
jector is not submitting himself to a mandate higher than posi-
I" See, e.g., Africa v. Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d 1025 (3d Cir. 1982) (claim of religious
rights by "naturalist" movement MOVE), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 908 (1982); Interna-
tional Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Barber, 650 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1981) (claim by
Krishna members for right to engage in San Kirtan ritual); Robinson v. Foti, 527 F.
Supp. 1111 (E.D. La. 1981) (claim by Rastafarians, who believe in the divinity of the late
Ethiopian emperor Haile Selassie, to religious status).
165 A personal claim may, of course, use traditional language to describe belief, see
Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (1989) (individual views de-
scribed as Christian, and not inconsistent with mainstream Christianity), or they may be
unique to the point of being bizarre, see, e.g., United States v. Ballard, 322 US. 78
(1944) (individual builds religion around claims of his own supernatural powers).
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tive law, but rather claiming the right to nullify legal obligations
based upon personal choice. This, of course, creates visions of
anarchy.""
Both Terry and Theriault present this latter type of free
exercise claim. Theriault's do-it-yourself religion will strike most
people not only as bizarre but also as having been created pre-
cisely for the purpose of gaining secular benefits for its founder.
To most observers, then, Theriault's beliefs are not only not
their beliefs but are so dissimilar that they do not even elicit a
tinge of empathy. Even worse, they create the impression that
by allowing them to trump community norms, the community
would be falling prey to a trickster.16 7
The religious claims in Terry are less strange. They are
grounded in mainstream religious views. Still, relatively few of
the co-religionists of the defendants in Terry feel that their reli-
gion compels them to oppose abortion not only in their personal
lives and by legal political activity, but also by illegal activity,
perhaps to the point of violence. Thus, even Terry evokes the
specter of the individual asserting a private right of nullification
against the community, in a way that looks like an act of indi-
vidual choice and will, rather than as a decision to submit duti-
fully to the demands of a power higher than the state. And while
26 See generally Richards, Conscience, Human Rights, and the Anarchist Chal-
lenge to the Obligation to Obey the Law, 18 GA. L. REv. 771, 780 (1984) (rejecting "[t]he
expansive claims of anarchism," but contending that the theory "expresses some endur-
ing truth about the values of democracy [and] the underlying democratic ideal of the
moral sovereignty of the people . . . ."). The enduring dilemma, of course, is to deter-
mine the limits of deference to conscience. One way to do this is to try to separate indi-
vidual acts of duty from individual assertions of will by deferring to claims which most
plausibly seem like submission to demands of competing authorities for obedience, such
as religious doctrine, and rejecting claims that seem to be self-generated. See generally
Choper, Defining "Religion" in the First Amendment, 1982 U. ILL. L. REv. 579 (for free
exercise purposes, the state should defer to decisions made to avoid "extratemporal con-
sequences," that is, punishment in some afterlife); Note, Religious Exemptions Under
the Free Exercise Clause: A Model of Competing Authorities, 90 YALE L.J. 350 (1980)
(free exercise inquiry is similar to a conflict of laws problem).
1, This is the problem at the heart of United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944),
A court may not reject a religious claim on the grounds that it is false but may on the
ground that it is insincere. But how can a factfinder, in determining sincerity, totally
ignore the objective reasonableness of the claim? See, e.g., United States v. Kuch, 288 F.
Supp. 439 (D.D.C. 1968), rejecting the bona fides of a "religion" centered around the use
of drugs and seeming to be organized for the purpose of "mocking established Institu.
tions." Id. at 444. See also Noonan, How Sincere Do You Have to Be to Be Religious?,
1988 U. ILL. L. REv. 713.
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the Constitution surely calls for limited government, it just as
surely does not call for government by unanimous consent, one
in which the individual has a right to selectively reject commu-
nity decisions.
It could hardly be said, of course, that pre-Smith free exer-
cise law created anything resembling anarchy. The Second Cir-
cuit's swift rejection of the Free Exercise Clause as a shield for
religiously motivated civil disobedience was entirely consistent
with such precedent.168 This raises the question presented in
Smith, particularly in Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion, of
why the doctrinal change was thought necessary. Cases like
Theriault may provide the answer.
The language of strict scrutiny provides some plausibility to
almost any free exercise claim. The test calls for some fact-based
inquiry into the fit between the state's goals and the means cho-
sen to achieve them. Thus, courts, even if ultimately endorsing
the state's action, will be reluctant to dismiss claims without a
reasonably careful hearing. The test, by holding out the hope of
success, encourages-or at least does not discourage-plaintiffs
to pursue even weak claims. Reducing the number of disputes,
or at least the number of those that must be given careful atten-
tion is, no doubt, a good thing. But whether these benefits out-
weigh the impediments placed by Smith on the practice of mi-
nority religions is far less clear.
The most frequent rejoinder to the claim that clarity and
predictability are paramount virtues in framing legal rules has
been that imprecise rules such as "balancing tests" permit
judges to do justice in the individual case. 69 Yet that justifica-
tion itself seems so imprecise, and so obviously begs the question
of what constitutes justice that it not only fails to rebut the
I" See, e.g., Northeast Women's Center v. McMonagle, 868 F.2d 1342 (3d Cir. 1989)
(rejecting justification defense in case involving interference with activities of abortion
center), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 901 (1989); United States v. Romano, 849 F.2d 812 (3d
Cir. 1988) (rejecting religion-based necessity defense to charge of damaging government
military property); United States v. Elder, 601 F. Supp. 1574 (S.D. Tex. 1985) (freedom
of religion not a defense to charge of illegally sheltering aliens from immigration
authorities).
169 Justice Scalia describes this position as "one image of how justice is done - one
case at a time, taking into account all the circumstances, and identifying within that
context the 'fair' result." This position he associates with popularly acclaimed lawgivers
such as Solomon, Saint Louis (Louis IX of France), and Judge Wapner, and rejects as
the "personal discretion to do justice" model Scalia, supra note 4, at 1176.
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claim that certainty is extremely important, but seems to bolster
that claim. A more sophisticated response is, however, possible.
The value of certainty may vary in different legal contexts.
These contexts may have less to do with the relative importance
of the claims being asserted by the individual than with the
function of the court in the overall process of defining rights and
duties. Courts and those who study their behavior often seem to
forget that, even under theories that allocate considerable law-
making power to judges, the process of lawmaking is something
of a dialogue between courts and the political branches of gov-
ernment.170 The rules of the dialogue, particularly the question
of who has the last word, vary. Not so obvious is the question of
how quickly the last word should be spoken.
When a court interprets a statute or defines a common law
rule, the virtues of clarity can be seen to clearly outweigh the
consequences of a wrong decision. This is so because the law-
making dialogue is not over. The court has said to the legislature
"we think you mean" (in the case of a statute) or "we think the
rule should be" (in the case of common law adjudication). In
each case, the legislature may effectively express its disagree-
ment.17 1 When the court strikes down a legislative act, it has
claimed the last word to a much larger extent. A wrong decision
has more serious consequences for the community, 172 but our
constitutional system accepts, to some extent, the risk of such
consequences as a necessary price for the value of judicial review
in checking legislative abuses of power. Even here, however, the
lawmaking dialogue may continue. A legislature may probe the
limits of its power, being told in turn, by subsequent court deci-
sions, that it has or has not crossed the constitutional line. Leg-
170 Justice Scalia does not make this distinction in his argument for predictable
rules. He discusses common law, statutory interpretation, and constitutional decision
making interchangeably. In each case, he discusses the reaction to Supreme Court deci-
sion making only in terms of the reaction of lower courts, not in terms of possible reac-
tion by legislatures. Scalia, supra note 4.
171 Largely for this reason, Professor Calabresi has advocated judicial power to in-
validate outmoded statutes, but without declaring them unconstitutional. Thus, if the
court is wrong in its assessment of the community's view of the statute, the legislature
may restore the law. G. CALABREsi, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATuTEs (1982).
172 For a critique of the way in which the Supreme Court aftempted to decide the
abortion question, once and for all, prior to the time when the legislative branches and
the people had sufficient time to resolve the problem, see M. GLENDON, ABORTION AND
DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW (1987).
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islative persistence may itself cause the courts to reconsider
their conclusions. Examples include the constitutionality of New
Deal social legislation17s and, more recently, the question of
abortion rights.174 In these cases and others, much has been
written about instances in which the Court has arguably at-
tempted to end discussion of controversial issues prematurely by
firmly entrenching individual rights.7
Less has been said about the negative consequences of pre-
maturely dismissing the possibility that a strong an-
timajoritarian right might exist. If courts announce unambigu-
ously that, with respect to a certain area of law, essentially
anything goes, the likelihood that legislatures will take constitu-
tional values into account is reduced. And surely, legislators
should, at least in some cases, take those values into account in
deciding to stop short of the full measure of legislative control
that would be permitted by the Court.7 ' Perhaps the starkest
recent example is the failure of the proposed constitutional
amendment permitting states to criminalize flag desecration.1 77
The adoption of the amendment would, of course, be beyond ju-
dicial challenge, yet opponents successfully argued that it would
impermissibly impinge on other constitutional values, and there-
fore was unwise.
The example of the flag amendment shows that legislators
17- Legislative persistence and public rejection of the Court's attempts to limit eco-
nomic regulation, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); A.LJ.L Schechter
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), led the Court to reconsider, in cases
such as N.L.R.B. v Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), and United States v.
Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
174 Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
175 See, e.g., GLENmoN, supra note 172. Professor Calabresi, although ultimately
agreeing with the Court's holding in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), has also written
of the negative consequences of attempting to resolve a highly charged social issue with-
out permitting significant segments of society to have their say. G. CALLBPm.. InnuS,
BELIEFS. ATrrruDns AND THE LAW: PRvATE LAW PERspEcrivzs ON A PUBC LAw PROnxnM
87-114 (1985).
176 It has been argued that legislators have largely lost the sense that they should
factor constitutional concerns into their work, since they see constitutional questions as
judicial matters. Mikva & Lundy, The 91st Congress and the Constitution, 38 U. Cm. L.
Rv. 449 (1971).
17 The proposed amendment: "The Congress and the States shall have power to
prohibit the physical desecration of the flag of the United States.," fell short of the nec-
essary two-thirds vote in both the Senate and the House. 136 CONo. REc. H4,037 (daily
ed. June 21, 1990) (House vote); 136 CONG. RIc. S8,704 (daily ed. June 26, 1990) (Senate
vote).
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may give weight to constitutional values even in the absence of
judicial review, but most would agree that this was an excep-
tional case. All too often, individual rights claims are buried in
the legislative process under the weight of claims of social bene-
fit or mere efficiency. 178 In such cases, the only weapon the indi-
vidual may have to at least gain a respectful hearing for a claim
of right is the plausible possibility that a court may undo the
proposed legislative product, to the inconvenience of the entire
community, and not least of all, to the inconvenience of the leg-
islators themselves. This will not assure that the individual
rights claim will be accepted by the legislature, nor should it do
so. But it will make it more likely that the claim will be listened
to with some degree of respect, and that, at least in cases where
the infringement is either inadvertent or correctable at little cost
to the overall goals of the legislative program, it will be.
The Free Exercise Clause and the rule of Smith serve as
excellent examples. Smith appears to stand as a green light to
legislators who prefer to ignore the concerns of minorities over
the burden placed by general legislation upon their religious
practices. Not only need legislators not defer to free exercise
claims, they need not even consider the possibility that exemp-
tions for believers might interfere only trivially with the goals of
the proposed legislation, or that effective alternative means exist
to achieve those goals without placing certain believers in the
position of choosing between the mandates of their religion and
the law. The only source of pressure to take such claims seri-
ously will be political, and that pressure will diminish as does
the size of the group of believers involved.
But if the possibility, however small, exists that a court
might find that the legislature has gone too far, the situation
changes. Now there is some pressure upon the legislature to lis-
ten to minority concerns. To be sure, those concerns may not
prevail, but they will be taken seriously. The risk that the stat-
ute might lead to litigation and might, in fact, be invalidated
may influence legislators to at least compromise where the cost
of doing so is small, that is, when the weight of the burden
placed on minority religions greatly exceeds the benefits that the
absence of an exemption provides to the community at large.
178 See Mikva & Lundy, supra note 176.
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Thus, the often criticized fact that Yoder's strict scrutiny
rarely led to the invalidation of statutes of general application
misses its full significance. The existence of the standard served
to remind legislators of the existence of a constitutional
value-the importance of individual conscience. Just as the pos-
sibility of losing at trial, however small, influences litigants to
move away from extreme demands and negotiate a settlement
that might maximize the welfare of both parties, the possibility
of litigation may serve to move legislators toward negotiation
with groups lacking political clout.
If this analysis is valid, then at least some degree of uncer-
tainty in enunciating the scope of the Free Exercise Clause be-
comes a virtue, rather than a vice. Still, a strong argument can
be made that the strict scrutiny of Sherbert and Yoder went too
far. An imprecise test is one thing; a test that is usually applied
in a way simply inconsistent with its language is something dif-
ferent. Perhaps strict scrutiny had to go; surely, however, some-
thing other than Smith's near abandonment of the notion of a
Free Exercise Clause with independent significance could have
been found to replace it.
Calls for reconsideration of Smith that offer only strict scru-
tiny as an alternative seem clearly unrealistic, and perhaps also
unwise. On the other hand, it may not be unrealistic, and would
certainly be wise, to search for alternative approaches to Smith
that are less sweeping in the scope of their protection of free
exercise values than Yoder, but still pay those values considera-
ble respect. Benjamin v. Coughlin may serve as a useful model.
There is no evidence that the court in Benjamin meant to
apply Smith. Although the decision was handed down shortly
after Smith, Benjamin was argued before Smith, and Benjamin
does not cite to it. Instead, Benjamin relies on prior cases set-
ting forth a standard applied in the Yoder era to claims made by
prisoners, a standard less protective than the full measure of
strict scrutiny." 9 An advocate of vigorous application of strict
scrutiny would fault Benjamin on the grounds that prison au-
thorities had failed to establish that the headgear and diet regu-
lations were the least restrictive means of achieving the state's
compelling interests. A proponent of Smith, on the other hand,
See O'Lone v. Estate of Shebazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987); Turner v. Safley, 482 Us.
78 (1987); PeU v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
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would see Benjamin as too deferential to the prisoners' claims
regarding hairstyles. Under this analysis, once a rational state
interest had been established. the inquiry should have come to
an end. Under either analysis, Benjamin was incorrect, albeit for
drastically different reasons.
And yet, when all is said and done, Benjamin appears to be
an eminently reasonable decision. It takes seriously, both in its
reasoning and its holding, not only the substantial state interests
involved in prison management, but also the need of respect for
diverse religious practices called for by the Free Exercise Clause.
Benjamin's balancing test will, no doubt, usually permit prison
authorities to prevail, but at the same time, does not give them a
constitutional blank check. The authorities, in their own inter-
est, have an incentive to give serious consideration to religion-
based claims, and to defer at least in cases where deference im-
poses few costs to institutional goals.
What Benjamin is not is a neat and clean analysis that
moves with inexorable logic to an inescapable and clear conclu-
sion. Like all balancing tests, -it is imprecise, and does not give
prison authorities a clear road map for the future. However, this
need not be considered a fatal flaw, even to the author of Smith.
Recently, in other First Amendment contexts, Justice Scalia has
endorsed the replacement of the traditional strict scrutiny de-
mand for the "least restrictive alternative" with a demand that
the regulation only be "narrowly tailored" to satisfy a substan-
tial interest.180 In the context of commercial speech, Justice
Scalia has stated that this requirement, while less protective
than traditional strict scrutiny, "is far different . . . from the
'rational basis' test . . . ."18'
To satisfy Justice Scalia's commercial speech test, govern-
ment must show that it seeks to protect a substantial interest
and that "the cost [has been] carefully calculated.' 18 2 This
seems strikingly similar to the types of questions called for by
Benjamin. Is the regulation really in pursuit of a substantial
public good? Has the government at least considered seriously
the claim of the individual? Are obvious alternatives available,
such that the exemption sought clearly does not threaten the
'8' Board of Trustees State Univ. of New York v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 477-78 (1989).
18 Id. at 480.
182 Id.
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substantial government interest?"1 3
Justice Scalia's test for commercial speech is not precise
and highly 'determinate. Yet he recognizes that in light of free
speech values, a test more protective of the individual than the
much more predictable rational basis test is required in cases
involving commercial speech. Regardless of how protective one
feels toward commercial speech, it would seem clear that the
First Amendment was, at the very least, intended to give reli-
gion no less protection than advertising. 1 4 Free speech cases il-
lustrate that the alternative to traditional strict scrutiny need
not be the rational basis test. An intermediate balancing test
may be formulated, and this is no less true with respect to free
exercise, as illustrated by Benjamin. Surely, civil libertarians
will not fail to note the heavy irony present here. Smith has so
altered free exercise jurisprudence that a standard once used to
give limited free exercise protection to prisoners now may be
championed as something that, if applied to all citizens, would
provide stronger constitutional safeguards than those which now
seem to exist. Yet that seems to be where free exercise law now
stands, and given that fact, Benjamin may have more signifi-
cance than its authors imagined.
A final observation may be appropriate regarding the les-
sons that this year's Second Circuit decisions may hold for the
continuing debate over the future of the Free Exercise Clause. If
the basic motivation behind Smith was to terminate authorita-
tively the kinds of free exercise claims represented by those in
Theriault, it is at least interesting to note that the new free ex-
ercise standards may not effectively end Theriault's lawsuit.
Smith says nothing about the first inquiry before the district
court on remand, that is, whether Theriault's new faith is so
similar to his previous church that his present claim is barred.1a 5
If his claim is not precluded, it would appear that at the very
least, a factual inquiry is in order. Theriault's claim is that
I See notes 61-63 and accompanying text supra.
184 This is, of course, a decided understatement. Professor McConnel concludes,
from a review of the history of the First Amendment, that it is clear that religious liberty
was, in fact, meant to receive protection beyond the general protection of belief and
expression on secular matters provided by the speech and press clause3 of the amend-
ment. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Reli-
gion, 103 HARv. L Rav. 1410 (1990).
18 See notes 36-56 and accompanying text supra.
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prison regulations single out his faith for particular disadvanta-
geous treatment, due to hostility to its message, and that
messages similar in their impact on legitimate government inter-
ests are preferred for access to the benefits Theriault seeks. 180 If
supported by the facts, this would seem to be precisely the type
of claim, a claim of overt hostility to a particular faith that, even
under Smith, is cognizable. Of course, the facts may not support
Theriault's claim, but the inquiry must nevertheless go forward
with at least some degree of uncertainty, and at some cost to the
resources of the judiciary. If Smith can be seen as using judicial
nuclear weapons for the purpose of eliminating claims seen as
merely annoying pests, it is'interesting to see that at least one of
those pests is alive and well, crawling out from the rubble of
perhaps more substantial free exercise claims dismantled by the
analysis in Smith.
Much of what has been said here with respect to the virtues
of imprecise standards in. furthering free exercise values may
also be applied to the debate over Establishment Clause norms.
The position that all "passive" displays are constitutionally per-
mitted since they are noncoercive provides at least apparent
clarity, certainly more so than the nonendorsement principle.
But one consequence of uncertainty will be to provide some
practical reason for political decisionmakers to listen to claims
that displays, or other government acts, label certain religious
views as preferred and create the impression that those who do
not share them are disfavored. Such claims should be treated
with respect, even if ultimately rejected. Imprecise rules regard-
ing the application of the religion clauses may carry with them
certain efficiency costs, but that is a worthwhile price to pay for
a heightened sensitivity to the concerns of religious minorities
who perceive threats to their First Amendment rights.
CONCLUSION
There is something reassuring about having a single, para-
digmatic case to turn -to in the analysis of any legal problem.
This is so even when, as has been the case with Lemon and
Yoder, the leading cases have been difficult to reconcile with
8' He seeks the right to use prison facilities for the observance of his religion and to
distribute religious literature. Theriault v. A Religious Office, 895 F.2d at 105.06.
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subsequent law, and contain rules that are, therefore, not very
helpful in predicting outcomes. Even if the rules were vague, or
otherwise defective, at least everyone knew that analysis began
with the recitation of a certain three-step formula.
With Yoder now unavailable in free exercise cases, and
Lemon the subject of rethinking from at least two different di-
rections, the comfort provided by established religion clause
standards is gone. If last term's religion clause cases from the
Second Circuit are viewed as merely the last chapter in the
Lemon-Yoder era, they are of little importance. The standards
applied are, or may soon be, rendered obsolete by the Supreme
Court, and the cases present facts that, while interesting, are
similar to those which have been litigated before. It may be the
very fact that the cases are rather typical religion clause claims,
however, that makes them interesting and significant at this
time. First, the cases illustrate why standards are changing.
Terry and Theriault are examples of the types of claims that
frustrate those who wish to keep what they perceive to be bi-
zarre or extreme religious claims out of the court system. Strict
scrutiny provided a forum for such claims, despite the fact that
they were rejected. Kaplan illustrates, yet again, the need for
more substance than Lemon provides to the standards used by
courts when examining Establishment Clause claims.
In addition, the cases may tell us something about the fu-
ture. Kaplan, and its purported application of the nonendorse-
ment test, may help determine whether nonendorsement or
noncoercion emerges as the fundamental principle of Establish-
ment Clause jurisprudence. Unfortunately, it provides ammuni-
tion for those who argue that nonendorsement is too indetermi-
nate a standard. Benjamin, on the other hand, may serve as a
model for those who wish to temper the harshness of Smith
while recognizing that reinstitution of the strict scrutiny stan-
dard of Yoder is exceptionally unlikely. While not intended as
such, Benjamin may be helpful in framing a new free exercise
test that, while not purporting to be absolute, will provide at
least a reasonable degree of protection for what has long been
seen as a central constitutional right.
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